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Purpose:  The purpose of this research paper is to answer the following two ques-
tions: 
1. Does a strong brand have an effect on the shareholder value upon the 
announcement of an M&A? 
2. Does the value creation effect within M&As depend on the firm’s size? 
 
Method:  We have conducted an empirical study including a quantitative analysis of 
how brands affect the value creation within M&As. An event study has 
been used, to calculate abnormal returns for firms acquiring strong brands. 
The abnormal returns have been analyzed with a multiple regression mod-
el. 
 
 
Theoretical framework:  This study’s primary theories regard M&A, brands and value creation 
through M&As. The agent theory and hubris hypothesis is thoroughly pre-
sented, amongst other theories concentrating on motives behind M&As. 
Theories on brand’s effect on the value creation within M&As are also pre-
sented, which are followed by the hypothesis formulation.  
 
Empirical foundation:  A sample containing 182 M&A transactions conducted by our treatment 
group, as well as by our control group, within the time period of 2005-
2014.  
 
Conclusion:  Our results show that strong brands affect the cumulative abnormal returns 
upon the announcement of M&As when the size effect is taken into con-
sideration. This effect weakens as the size of a firm increases. This sug-
gests that strong brands could be valuable for smaller firms when conduct-
ing M&As and that the larger firms with stronger brands are associated 
with less profitable M&As. A reason for this could be over confident man-
agers, who according to the hubris hypothesis might overestimate the value 
of the target, thus pay high premiums and consequently suffer from the 
winners curse. These conclusions have led us to formulate a new hypothe-
sis called “The Branded Delusion”. 
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1. Introduction 
The introductory chapter reviews the research problem and its purpose. The chapter provides 
a brief discussion of the research delimitations and the thesis’s outline.  
1.1 Background 
M&A is not a new phenomenon even though it has experienced a strong growth in recent 
decades (Koller et Al., 2010). M&As constitute an important source of growth for today’s 
firms, and more firms take on projects of this kind in order to create value for the sharehold-
ers, through value enhancements in brand assets (Kumar et Al., 2004). Nevertheless, most of 
M&A transactions are value destroying for the acquiring firm’s shareholders (Koller et Al., 
2010).   
 
Within the process of conducting an M&A, brands play a vital role (Keller, 1993). Research 
shows that many companies pay a substantial amount of money in able to acquire a specific 
brand. Examples such as when Philip Morris bought the brand Kraft, they paid a price of 12.9 
billion dollars, which was four times what the brand was worth. Hewlett Packard made a 
similar deal when acquiring Compaq’s brands for 1.5 billion dollars more than the brands 
were worth, and ended up paying 24 billion dollars for them (Bahadir, Bharadwaj, Srivastava, 
2008). In 1994, Quaker Oats conducted an M&A and acquired the brand Snapple, which they 
had to pay 1.7 billion dollars for. This was a premium price, much higher than what Coca Co-
la offered (Deighton, 2002). Consequently, Quaker Oats suffered from the Winner’s curse.  
 
The importance of strong brands within M&As is apparent in the example when Coca Cola 
and Pepsi Co. started a bidding war against each other and both companies fought to acquire 
the brand Quaker Oats. The war was won by Pepsi Co. which acquired Quaker Oats for the 
premium price of 13.4 billion dollars in stocks, and with that received control of Quaker Oat’s 
renowned brand Gatorade (Sorkin and Winter, 2000).  
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1.2 Problem discussion 
Despite the knowledge that most M&As are value destroying, firms decide to conduct them. 
By making this strategic decision, the acquiring firms obtain everything from cost reductions 
due to efficiency improvements, larger distribution channels, scale of economies etc. 
 
There is comprehensive literature that discusses value creation of M&As, however, there is a 
knowledge gap of if and how firms create value by acquiring brands (Varadarajan, DeFanti, 
Busch, 2006). The brand variable is at many times overseen by managers as well as by re-
search, but is an important factor to keep in mind when conducting an M&A.  
 
The American multi-billion dollar firm ConAgra has carried 48 different brands in their brand 
portfolio, but only developed 3 out of these themselves. This is one example out of many that 
shows how many firms make a business out of acquiring and disposing brands. Despite this, 
there is lack of both information and knowledge when conducting these important strategic 
decisions (Bahadir, Bharadwaj, and Srivastava, 2008). 
 
We will take into account current literature that regards value creation within M&As, howev-
er, little is known about the brand’s impact. Therefore, we will take a new approach on cur-
rent literature and contribute with an addition of how brands affect the value creation within 
M&As.  
 
1.2.1 Previous research 
Previous research concerning M&As has focused on the strategic factors affecting the transac-
tion and decision-making. Since every M&A is unique it has been difficult to achieve consen-
sus about underlying motives, success- and failure rates. (Cartwrigth and Schoenberg, 2006)  
 
Prior research shows that brands are one the most valuable intangible assets a firm possess, 
and that many managers nowadays invest heavily in developing their brands (Keller and 
Lehmann, 2006). Wiles, Morgan and Rego (2012) have studied brand acquisitions as a strate-
gic marketing tool to see if companies improve their performance by purchasing brands from 
others, and with that see which effect brand acquisitions have on stock returns. 
 
 
 
! 8!
1.3 Purpose and research questions 
In this study, we address the abovementioned knowledge gap by concentrating on two ques-
tions of specific theoretical importance and managerial interest. The purpose of this research 
paper will therefore be to contribute to existing literature concerning value creating M&As, 
with a new approach, and by that answer the following two questions: 
 
1. Does a strong brand have an effect on the shareholder value upon the announcement 
of an M&A? 
2. Does the value creation effect within M&As depend on the firm’s size? 
 
1.4 Delimitations 
Since this research paper focuses on strong brands, it became natural for us to not delimit our-
selves to one specific country, but instead to include the strongest brands there are worldwide. 
Every year, a brand consultancy called Interbrand, presents a list of the 100 strongest brands 
in the world. These reports have served as a basis for our collected treatment group, a list 
where the strongest brands in the world are presented. We are aware of that the trustworthi-
ness from using a sample based on results from a commercial brand consultancy in an aca-
demic research paper might be criticized. However, Interbrand happens to be the number one 
brand consultancy in the world, and its methodology and results have been used and referred 
to in many academic research papers. Therefore, we feel that we have enough support to pro-
vide a credible result from using Interbrand as our main data sample resource.  
 
We have chosen to use a time frame for our data sample, from 2005 until this date. The reason 
for this is that the data base Zephyr, which we have exported all our transactions from, does 
not contain data that goes further back in time.  
 
1.5 Thesis outlines 
This thesis will start with an introduction into the subject of M&As, and how significant 
brands are for the value creation within M&As. After the introduction, the thesis will continue 
with the theoretical framework; containing a definition and background of M&As, motives 
behind M&As, definition of brands and their contribution to the shareholder value within 
M&As and finishes off with a hypothesis formulation. The third chapter thoroughly explains 
our method, and with that, our data sampling process, and the statistical tests. The results of 
this study are presented in the forth chapter, analyzed in the fifth, and then we present our 
! 9!
conclusion in the sixth chapter. The thesis is finalized by giving suggestions on continuing 
research areas. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
This chapter provides an insight into the theories that explain the M&A phenomena and the 
development and definition of brands. Furthermore, the importance of brand in strategic de-
cision-making concerning M&As will be discussed. Lastly, a hypothesis formulation is pre-
sented. 
 
2.1 What are mergers and acquisitions? 
 
2.1.1 Definition of M&As 
Mergers and acquisitions are an important part of today’s economy that managers take on in 
order to create value for diverse stakeholders (Koller et Al., 2010). In a merger, the assets of 
the acquirer or bidder and the target firm are combined into one entity. The bidder acquires 
the target firm with stock or cash or with an arrangement of both these. Then, the bidder’s 
own stock remains outstanding after the transactions, whereas the targets shares disappear. 
Both “merger” and “acquisition” means practically the same thing, but the expression “acqui-
sition” is employed to designate the deal per se. If the acquisition is not friendly and not 
wished by the target’s board and shareholder, the acquisition is said to be a hostile takeover. 
A more important distinction is between “M&A” and “consolidation”, in which the assets of 
two different firms are combined in a way that they create a completely new company (Ogden 
et Al., 2003). Another manner to purchase other firms is through buyouts. In a buyout, a 
group of individuals (eg. a firm or a private equity firm) acquires and takes the control over an 
entire firm. Normally, these kinds of acquisitions are financed by a large amount of debt, in 
which case the transaction is called leverage buyout (Ogden et Al., 2003). 
 
An M&A can be either horizontal, vertical or conglomerate merger depending on the charac-
teristics. In a horizontal merger, the bidder and the target operate in the same industry. That is, 
a firm acquires its competitors. In a vertical merger, the bidder acquires either its customer or 
supplier. If the bidder and the target operate in unrelated industries, the M&A is a conglomer-
ate merger (Berk and DeMarzo, 2011). 
 
2.1.2 M&As: Background 
M&As are not a new phenomena even thought they have experienced a strong growth in re-
cent decades. However, most of the M&A transactions have been value destroying for the ac-
quiring firm’s shareholders (Koller et Al., 2010). 
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The historical development of M&A transactions is normally divided into several waves with 
diverse characteristics. Typically, these waves have started when firms have had a strong cap-
ital liquidity and access to capital markets – during economic expansion – and finished once 
the periods of depression have begun (Gaughan, 2007).  Various other reasons have affected 
the development of M&A activities, such as changes in regulatory or economical factors and 
progress in technology (Gaughan, 2007). 
 
2.2 Motives behind M&As 
This section provides a review on the current empirical findings explaining M&As.  
 
2.2.1 Best owner and the market for corporate control  
Koller et Al. (2010) discuss that the owner of a firm is most likely to change during the firm’s 
life cycle. The founder of a firm might not be the best person to manage a large international 
firm. He or she might not have adequate managerial skills or he might lack the capability to 
penetrate new markets. Instead, the founder discovered a gap in the market and had the enthu-
siasm to take a risk and establish a business. When the firm expands, someone with more ex-
perience in managing large firms might be better off taking the hold on the firm. This is in 
line with Henry G. Manne’s (1965) finding. He described the corporate control as a valuable 
asset and successful mergers as a product of an efficient market for corporate control. He ar-
gued that if a company’s managers’ performances were weak, the market would punish them 
and it would be incorporated in the stock price. According to him, the most efficient mecha-
nism for the corporate control were M&As. The underlying assumption for the market of cor-
porate control was a positive relationship between the managerial efficiency and share price. 
Furthermore, Jensen and Ruback (1983) came to the same conclusion and argued that the 
M&As, especially takeovers, do not create value through an increased market power, but ra-
ther through the competition in the market for corporate control. They related the corporate 
control with managerial labor market, in which the managers compete for the control, and 
create value through economies of scale as well as synergies. M&As remove excess capacity 
and restructures resources, which is an indication of a vital and dynamic industry (Ogden et 
Al, 2003; Koller et Al., 2010). Consequently, the best owner of a firm changes during the 
firm’s life cycle to respond to its specific needs (Koller et Al., 2010). 
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2.2.2 Growth strategy 
Most of the firms acquiring other firms seek to grow faster than the organic growth would al-
low them (Das & Kapil, 2012 ; Gaughan, 2007). Firms might strengthen their own market po-
sition by acquiring competitors in the same industry, by expanding in other industries or by 
escalating operations outside the native country (Gaughan, 2007).  
 
If a firm decides to expand into another industry, it also diversifies its operations and the firm 
as a whole, becomes more difficult to manage. Besides, large firms often possess sizeable 
portfolios of businesses before engaging in acquiring other firms (Koller, et Al. 2010). It is 
extensively discussed within the field of finance whether the diversification really contributes 
to the value creation (Gaughan, 2007). Some companies like, General Electric Company, have 
managed to pursue several successful conglomerate mergers (Bartlett, 2006). Still, empirical 
findings have often proved the contrary. Dennis et Al. (2002) argues that industrial and global 
diversification is associated with lower stock returns. Doukas et Al. (2002) studied Swedish 
takeovers between 1980 and 1995 and made similar conclusions that the diversification does 
not create additional value. This is rationale, as it is cheaper for the investors (shareholders) to 
diversify their portfolios than it is for firms to diversify their operations (Gaughan, 2007).    
 
Luypaert and Huyghebaert (2008) pointed out that one important driver for growth through 
diversifying M&As is intangible capital as it gives access to new expertise. They also found 
that the acquirers often are large, which they motivated with an easier access to capital mar-
kets.  
 
It is often assumed that firms must grow in order to survive and managers thus might act after 
these expectations (Gaughan, 2007). Therefore, they might subconsciously seek growth con-
stantly to beat the treadmill expectations, especially if the firm has had a successful past per-
formance (Koller et Al., 2010).    
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2.2.3 Synergy Hypothesis 
According to the synergy hypothesis, the acquirer’s management can achieve value enhance-
ments by reallocating the targets assets. These enhancements can be operational and/or finan-
cial (Gaughan, 2007).  
 
The operational synergies are higher incomes and/or cost reductions in the form of improve-
ments in production processes, economies of scale, access to new resources, and an increased 
bargaining power  (Bradley et Al., 1983). Thus, the acquirer aims to create value through 
combining and restructuring the operations and assets (Ogden et Al., 2003). Healy et Al. 
(1990) studied large M&A transactions in the U.S between 1979 and 1984 and found that 
combined cash flows improve as a result of a more efficient use of assets. Powell et Al. 
(2005) made similar conclusions when they studied takeovers in the UK, using a regression 
and change model between 1985 and 1993.  
 
Financial synergy is a result of an M&A when the market value of the combined firm is high-
er than the values of two separate firms together (Ogden et Al., 2003).  This can be the case 
when, for example, an M&A decreases the bankruptcy risk and thus, increases the debt capac-
ity. The traditional trade-off theory of optimal capital structure, states that a firm’s optimal 
capital structure balances out the expected value of future financial distress costs and benefits 
of the tax shield (Ogden et Al., 2003). This is in line with Bruner’s (1988) finding. He found 
that the acquirers have relatively low debt-to-equity ratios before the acquisition and they take 
on more debt after acquisition. Consequently, as the risk of a bankruptcy and the cost related 
to financial distress decrease after an M&A, the merged firm can create value by increasing 
the debt-equity ratio and benefits of tax shield. According to the Modigliani and Miller’s 
(1958) first proposition, a firm’s market value does not depend on its choice about the capital 
structure and thus, this could not constitute a motive for M&As. This presumes that the capi-
tal market has no transaction cost or taxes, which is violated. 
 
2.2.4 Hubris Hypothesis 
The Hubris Hypothesis states that the bidder’s managers are overconfident and overestimate 
their knowledge and capabilities. That’s why; they might overestimate the value of synergies 
and subsequently overpay for the acquisition. Therefore, overconfident manager are more of-
ten exposed to the winner’s curse, which can also provide an explanation for high premiums 
paid (Roll, 1986). Roll (1986) continues to argue that the acquisition will not occur if the val-
! 14!
uation is under the market value of the firm. This obligates the acquirer to overpay for the tar-
get since the target’s managers would not accept a bid that is below the market value. Conse-
quently, Roll (1986) states that it is expected that the acquirers stock price declines and the 
target’s increases due the allocation of the value. Agrawal et Al., (1992) proved this empiri-
cally and found that the acquirer experience a loss of approximately 10 % upon the an-
nouncement of an M&A. 
 
2.2.5 Agent Theory  
The premise of the principal-agent theory is the separation between ownership and control of 
a firm (Ogden, 2003).  Managers, “agents”, are to act on the behalf of shareholders and their 
primary task is to maximize the market value of equity. In reality, there is an interest conflict 
between the two parties and managers might act in their own interest (Shefrin, 2005). Manag-
ers of the bidding firm can engage in empire building. The agent theory gives likewise a mo-
tive for M&As, as managers might seek to acquire other firms in order to expand their empire 
at the expense of the shareholders (Ogden, 2003). Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis 
also provides a motive for M&As. He argues that managers of cash rich firms tend to overin-
vest and thus engage in M&A activities. He explains that managers have personal reasons to 
increase the firm’s size as it enforces their managerial power and increases their compensa-
tion. In turn, M&As can function as a device that mitigates the principal-agent –problem by 
removing the target’s incompetent or self-interest managers (Andrade et Al. 2001).  
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After having discussed current literature that regards motives behind M&As from a financial 
perspective, we will now continue with an introduction into the subject of brands.  
 
 
2.3 The development and definition of brands 
The definition of brands has changed at several occasions through times. Every definition ex-
poses an idea at a specific time in history. Changes occur when new competitors arise, which 
demands different management measures.  
 
Kapferer (2012) claims that when the concept of brands first started to develop, the original 
thought behind brands originated from the law. Brands were created to mark cattle in the Wild 
West of America, in order to establish which cattle belonged to which farmer, so that none 
would get stolen. The mark on the cattle, which developed to be the brand, ensured the herit-
age of the cattle and distinguished one cattle originating from one ranch. Chernatony and 
Dall'Olmo-Riley (1998) agrees with this and claims that brands originating from the law can 
be seen in our modern society of today. Brands are assets, and to protect these, businesses 
seek legal ownership to protect their brands, against imitating firms. They continue by dis-
cussing the example of the branding strategy for Absolute Vodka. This strategy highlights the 
importance of constantly observing competitors' brand movements, to be able to prevent any 
firm from imitating Absolut Vodka’s name or design of the bottle.  
 
Kapferer (2012) continues with the developments of brands, and states that brands were later 
on in history seen as a set of mental associations, which together enhanced the value of a 
product. Examples such as blind tests with the soft drinks Pepsi and Coke, show proof of this 
since people tend to prefer Pepsi instead of Coke, when doing blindfolded tastings. However, 
majority claims to prefer Coke over Pepsi when they are aware of what brand they taste. This 
suggests that brands are not only in the product, but also in people’s minds.  
 
The definition of brands has taken new approaches in the later years, and researchers now 
state that brands add value to the consumers. Clark (1987) agrees upon this and states that the 
important link between consumers and marketers are value-adding brands.  
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2.4 Value creation through M&As  
 
2.4.1 Value creation 
Koller et Al., use the following equation to describe the value creation for the bidder:  
 
Value created for the acquirer  
= 
(Stand Alone Value of Target +Value of performance improvements) 
 - 
 (Market Value of Target + Acquisition premium) 
 
Thus, M&As create value if the value improvements exceed the acquisition premium (Koller 
et Al., 2010).  
 
The empirical research has showed that most of all M&A deals are value destroying for the 
bidders’ shareholders (Koller et Al., 2010). Cartwright and Schoneberg (2006) argue that the 
failure rate lies somewhere between 44 and 45 percent. Agrawal et Al. (1992) studied M&A 
of NYSE and AMEX listed companies during 1955 and 1987 and found the shareholders of 
the bidders experienced a loss of 10 percent over the first post merger years.  
 
Still, some researchers have argued the contrary. Jensen and Ruback (1983) claim that the 
shareholders of the bidder do not experience losses upon the announcement of an M&A. As-
quith, Bruner, Mullins (1983) found that the bidders’ shareholders actually received a return 
of 5.2 percent when they adjusted the data for the size of the target firm. That is, they propose 
that the shareholder returns are contingent on the relative size of the target.  
 
Overall, M&As are value creating for the economy as a whole and the target firm’s share-
holders usually benefit from the takeovers (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). The important feature 
here is the allocation of the value, which occurs through high premiums that the bidders pay 
(Asquith et Al., 1982; Roll 1986). Roll argues that the premium paid for the target firm, is a 
measurement error made by the managers of the bidding since there are no possible synergy 
gains under the market efficiency hypothesis. 
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There is no common consensus in the field of finance on why managers execute M&As even 
though they tend to fail very often (Lubatkin, 1983).  
 
2.4.2 Brands contribution to the shareholder value in M&As 
Successful M&As that have been conducted in the past, all have different strategic underlying 
purposes. In many cases, brands have played important factor, which have contributed to a 
positive outcome on the shareholder value. 
According to Kaplan and Norton (1992, 1993) the gap between marketing and finance has 
lately been decreasing, since it has become more common to assess how different marketing 
activities, such as branding, affect the financial aspect of shareholder value.  
Gruca and Rego (2005) claim that by investing in brands with the help of marketing and ad-
vertisement, channels of distribution and customers can be affected, which impacts a firm’s 
cash flows, and as a result affects shareholder value. According to Srivastava, et Al. (1998), 
brands can have an affect on shareholder value if one fosters and invests in them. This can 
have many benefits such as contributing to increasing cash flows and a firm’s market value. 
Wiles, et Al., (2012) argue that brands can have a significant impact on the shareholder value. 
Dacin and Smith (1994) agree, and claim that brands are one of a company’s most valuable 
resources. 
 
2.6 Hypothesis formulation 
With the help of the abovementioned theoretical framework, we will now discuss the hypoth-
eses that will be used in this study.  
Based on discussed theories, we have concluded that M&A is not a new phenomenon and that 
they are conducted to a great extent in able for firms to expand and create value for their 
shareholders. However, majority of all M&As that are conducted are value destroying for the 
firm’s shareholders (Koller et Al., 2010). Many renowned M&As are conducted by large, 
global firms such as Coca Cola, Apple, Microsoft etc. These firms are not only big in size and 
revenues, but also hold the strongest brands in the world.  
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Keller and Lehmann (2006) state that brands are critically important to the firms owning 
them. Wiles et Al., (2012) have done research to see if firms improve their performance by 
purchasing brands, and how the stock prices react when conducting M&As. Lane and Jacob-
son (1995) claim that brands enable firms to make profits that are greater than they would be 
by merely tangible assets. Madden et Al. (2006) suggest that shareholder value can be creat-
ed, in the form of abnormal stock returns, by developing firm’s brands. His findings show that 
American firms with strong brands that have been ranked in the list “Top 100 Most Valuable 
Global Brands” by BrandZ, Millward Brown’s brand equity database, have produced addi-
tional returns when compared to other brands. Hsu et Al., (2013) has found in their research 
that there is a positive correlation between stock performance and the value of brands.  
Based on this information, we studied whether or not the brand has an effect on M&As. Thus, 
our first hypothesis was developed as follows: 
 
H1: Strong brands have an effect on the cumulative abnormal returns upon an announcement 
of an M&A 
 
The firms holding, not only strong but the strongest, brands in the world are on a yearly basis 
reported by the brand consultancy called Interbrand. The brands that year after year top the 
list of the world’s 100 strongest brands, are the cash cows Apple, Coca Cola, Microsoft etc. 
These firms hold the strongest brands in the world, and naturally, they are also extremely 
large in size.  Hitt, et Al., (2009) claim that the acquirer’s size and the relative size are im-
portant variables and the most commonly used in the research of M&As. Equally, Luypaert 
and Huyghebaert (2008) argue that the size of a firm plays an important role when conducting 
M&As and that large firms more often conduct M&As since they have an easier access to the 
capital markets. Asquith et Al., (1983) and Fröhls et Al., (1998) suggest that the abnormal re-
turns are lower for larger firms than for smaller firms. The abnormal returns for the acquirer 
are related to the relative size of the deal (Asquith et Al., 1983). That is, we expect the ab-
normal returns to be lower for the firms in the treatment group than for the firms in the con-
trol group. Bearing this information in mind, we have developed our second hypothesis:  
 
H2: The value creation effect of a strong brand depends on the size effect 
 
 
 
! 19!
3. Method 
This chapter will present our research process, by first explaining our method - event study. 
The collection of data is thoroughly described, to continue into a presentation of the statisti-
cal significance testing and of the regression analysis.  
3.1 Research design and strategy 
The research design that we have used within our work is out of a deductive approach. A de-
ductive methodology means that hypotheses have been created, based upon already existing 
theories, which in our case have been focusing on brands and value creation within M&As. 
Our process of work has followed what Bryman and Bell (2013) calls “the deductive process” 
(p. 31) and with that our hypotheses have laid the foundation for our empirical collection of 
data. We have used quantitative research as a research strategy, which means to collect nu-
merical data. 
 
We have used an event study accordingly to Tuch and O’Sullivan (2007) who describe event 
studies as a measurement of how share price perform for acquiring firms upon the announce-
ment of an M&A. By doing this, we will be able to analyze what kind of impact M&As have 
on the shareholder value in the short run. This is well suited for our research, since we will 
study if a strong brand has an effect on the shareholder value upon the announcement of 
M&A. In addition, an event study is significantly suited for us, since event studies have been 
used for a long time in able to help firms quantify the value of different marketing actions, 
such as investments in brands (Wiles, et Al., 2012). 
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3.2 Treatment and control group  
The first step in our method was to gather a list of firms holding the strongest brands in the 
world. These firms have been collected from yearly reports produced by the brand consultan-
cy Interbrand1. The reports by Interbrand present the 100 strongest brands in the world on a 
yearly basis, measured in US dollars. From these reports, we have collected a list consisting 
of all of the strongest brands in the world between the years of 2005 until this day. This list 
ended up to be 47 firms all together.  
 
The reason for why we could not use 100 firms was since some of the brands that were not 
actual firms, solely brands. Such as the brand Gillette belonging to the firm Procter & Gam-
ble. Another reason for why we could not include some firms, such as Pepsi, was because 
they had conducted several M&As within the same event window. In this case, we could not 
have separated the individual effect of both transactions on the stock prices. Lastly, some 
firms on the Interbrand list, such as IKEA, could not be used since they are not publicly trad-
ed and the stock prices were not available.  
 
The 47 firms that made it to our list will serve as our “treatment group“ and which we will 
refer to as “strong brands”.  
 
Further on, we have studied whether the firms with strong brands execute M&As, which have 
an effect on the shareholder value. To be able to test if these strong brands are likely to exe-
cute M&As that contribute to the value creation, a “control group” was created. This group 
contains 47 firms with “inferior brands”.  
 
The control group has been selected so that one firm from the control group shall serve as an 
equivalent firm to one from the treatment group, i.e. an “inferior brand” has been matched !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!! Interbrand is the world’s largest and leading brand consultancy, which started its business in 1974 and have 
today nearly 40 offices around the world. Interbrand has developed its very own brand valuation methodology, 
which they have been using since 1988. With the help of this methodology, Interbrand tries to determine how a 
brand affects a client’s business result, both in financial and customer terms. The methodology takes specific 
factors into account, such as strong brands’ impact on customers choice and loyalty, how strong brands attract 
and motivate talent, as well as how brand lowers the cost of capital. Up to this day, Interbrand has performed 
thousands of brand valuations, and their ways of doing it has been recognized and praised by businesses, stand-
ard setting authorities, academic and regulatory bodies, and accountancy and legal practices. This gives the busi-
ness great knowledge, and fundamental market trustworthiness. (source: http://www.interbrand.com/en/ ) 
! 21!
with a “strong brand”. Every firm from the control group has been selected from the same in-
dustry that its match in the treatment group operates, meaning that they share the same SIC 
code. We have controlled for the SIC code for each and every company with the help of the 
program Capital IQ.  
 
 
Treatment 
group Control group Treatment group Control group 
3M St. Jude Medical Inc. HP Toshiba Corporation  
Accenture WPP Plc. HTC Harris Corporation 
Adidas  Deckers Outdoor Corp IBM Vmware, Inc 
Adobe Monitise Plc. Intel Broadcom Corp. 
Amazon Liquidity Services Inc.  Kellogg's Post holdings 
American Ex-
press Cowen Group Inc. L'oréal Kao Corporation 
Avon McBride Plc Marriott Hyatt Hotels Corp. 
Axa Legal & General Group Plc MasterCard Western Union Company 
Burberry PVH Corp.  Microsoft  Activition Blizzard, Inc. 
Campell's Bonduelle SA Nestlé Cloetta 
Caterpillar 
MSC Industrial Direct Co 
Inc. 
Discovery communi-
cation Dish Network Corporation 
Cisco Lexmark International Inc. Novartis  Actavis plc.  
Coca cola 
Suntory Beverage & Food 
Limited Oracle The Priceline Group Inc. 
Colgate-
Palmoliv Revlon Pfizer 
Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., 
Ltd 
Danone Premier Foods plc Phillips ASML Holding NV 
Disney CBS Corporation Ralph Lauren Perry Ellis International Inc.  
Ebay IHS Inc.  SAP Hexagon AB 
Facebook United Online.Inc. Starbucks Darden Restaurants Inc.  
Fedex 
Southwest Airlines Compa-
ny Thomson Reuters 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 
Company 
Ford Group 1 Automotive Inc. Visa Total System Services Inc. 
GAP Nordstrom Inc. Volkswagen Continental AG 
Goldman 
Sachs 
Raymond James Financial, 
Inc Xerox Salesforce.com Inc. 
Google CenturyLink, Inc.  Yahoo Symantec Corporation 
Hertz Avis Bugdet Group, Inc ∑  47 ∑  47 
Table 3.2 
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Other variables that have been considered, however not been able to match perfectly between 
the treatment and control groups are:  
• Stock exchange: where the firm is traded 
• The country of origin of the acquiring firm 
 
The firms from the control group have been selected based on approximately how many firms 
from the treatment group that are exchanged on the same stock exchange. So if there are ap-
proximately 24 firms from the treatment group that are exchanged at NYSE, then the control 
group contains approximately 24 firms that are exchanged at NYSE.  
 
3.2.1 List of where the companies are traded 
STOCK  
EXCHANGE Nb of firms, Treatment group % Nb of firms, Control group % 
EURONEXT 4 9% 2 4% 
LSE 1 2% 5 11% 
NASDAQ 12 26% 10 21% 
NYSE 24 51% 23 49% 
SIX 1 2% 0 0% 
SWX 1 2% 0 0% 
TSEC 1 2% 0 0% 
XETRA 3 6% 1 2% 
OMX 0 0% 2 4% 
TSE 0 0% 4 9% 
Total 47 100% 47 100% 
Table 3.2 
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The same goes for country of origin for the acquiring firm. If there are approximately 34 
firms from the treatment group originating from the United States, then the control group con-
tains approximately 34 firms originating from the United States. 
 
3.2.2 List of the companies’ origin  
Country Nb Treatment group % Nb Control group % 
Canada 1 2% 0 0% 
France  3 6% 1 2% 
Germany  3 6% 1 2% 
Ireland  1 2% 1 2% 
Netherands 1 2% 1 2% 
Switzerland 2 4% 0 0% 
Taiwan 1 2% 0 0% 
United Kingdom 1 2% 5 11% 
United States 34 72% 32 68% 
Japan  0 0% 4 9% 
Sweden  0 0% 2 4% 
Total 47 100% 47 100% 
Table 3.3 
 
3.3. Interbrand in academic research  
Every year, Interbrand publishes a report, where they financially value the 100 strongest 
brands in the world. We have used this report for our research and listed the strongest brands 
between the years 2005-2013. Since this list plays a significant role in our thesis work, we 
find it important to present previous academic research that has incorporated Interbrand’s val-
uation methodology in their work, to be able to provide a credible and reliable result. Inter-
brand’s methodology regarding brand valuation is commonly used and referred to in academ-
ic research. A research paper by Fehle, et Al., (2008), called "Brand value and asset pricing”, 
has used Interbrand’s annual list of the World’s most valuable brands in their data sample. In 
addition, Hsu, et Al., (2013) also refer to Interbrand in their article “The Impact of Brand 
Value on Financial Performance”, where they explore if financial brand values reported by 
Interbrand have an effect on the brand portfolio return for firms. Johansson et Al., (2012) 
have used Interbrand’s methodology to financially measure brand value in their article “The 
performance of global brands in the 2008 financial crisis: A test of two brand value 
measures”. 
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3.4 Data collection and selection criteria  
A large amount of data collection has been needed to perform this kind of research. The most 
suitable database for this purpose, just like Le Nadant and Perdreau (2006) used in their re-
search, has been Zephyr’s database for M&As, which provides detailed information about 
M&A transactions.2 
 
The selection of M&A data has been conducted between the years of 2005 until today. The 
database Zephyr only holds information from 2005, and therefore we were not able to go fur-
ther back in time.  
 
When searching for M&As within the Zephyr database, we used the following search criteria:  
 
• Deal type: Acquisition, Merger 
• Percentage of stake: Initial 49.9%, Final stake 100% 
• Deal status: Announced, Pending, Completed 
• Time period: 2005-until current date 
 
When having filled out these search criteria we did a manual search for each and every firm 
within our treatment group and control group respectively. For each firm, we exported all 
their conducted M&A transactions within our chosen time period, from Zephyr.  
 
The next step was to manually control all the exported M&As and see how many of the trans-
actions that composed 5% of the acquiring firm’s total equity. The reason for this was that the 
deal had to be large enough in able to affect the acquirer’s stock price. A similar method has 
been used from authors such as Gupta and Misra (2007), however, they chose to test which 
transactions composed 10% of the acquiring company’s total assets. We chose to set the per-
centage at 5% since we did not want to loose too much of the transaction sample we had left.   
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Zephyr is the most comprehensive database of deal information and contains information on M&A, IPO, pri-
vate equity and venture capital deals and rumours. The coverage on Zephyr increases daily - in July 2012 Zephyr 
covered around one million deals and rumours. (Zephyr, 2014) !
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All of our collected transactions have then manually been controlled for twice, to ensure that 
no mistakes were made, and to ensure that all of them lived up to the selection criteria. Some 
of the transactions had to be dropped because of the reason that the deals did not exceed the 
limit of 5% of the acquiring firm’s total equity. This was to ensure that the deal was large 
enough to affect the acquirer’s stock price. 
 
Another reason for loss of transactions was if two or more deals were announced within the 
same event or estimation windows.  
 
When all the transactions had been controlled for errors, and the ones that would not meet the 
requirements dropped, we ended up with a sample containing 182 M&A transactions. 
 
When the sample was controlled and cleared, we used the program Thomson Reuters 
Datastream Advanced to export all the stock prices for each and every company from both 
our treatment group as well as our control group.  
 
3.5. The efficient market model and event study  
Fama (1970, p. 383) defines the main role of capital markets as follows: “The primary role of 
the capital market is allocation of ownership of the economy’s capital stock”. Under the con-
ditions of efficient market model, at any point in time, all assets are fairly priced and security 
prices should represent the rational values. Fama categorizes market efficiency into three 
groups depending on the sources of information: weak, semi-strong and strong efficient. In a 
weak efficient market security prices reflect only information about the historical prices. If the 
market is semi-strong, the security prices incorporate all publicly available information. Final-
ly, in a strong efficient market, the security prices adapt to both publicly available information 
and privately held information. Though, the efficient market model has its limitations, as the 
markets only are efficient if sufficiently many investors manage to collect and analyze the da-
ta and compound it the accurate stock prices (Fama, 1970).  
 
In this study, we have captured the value creation upon the M&A announcements with an 
event study. The basic assumption on the event study methodology is the efficient market 
model, in which the security prices incorporate all information available to investors (Fama, 
1970). 
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3.6 How to study the announcement effect of an M&A? Event studies 
The idea of an event study is to study the changes in the market value of a firm or evolvement 
of security prices upon an announcement of an event such as, M&As, dividends and earnings 
changes (MacKinlay, 1997). Fama, et Al., (1969) first used this methodology in the late 
1960’s and since this, the event study methods have been widely used in the field of finance 
(MacKinlay, 1997). In an event study, the market “benchmark” return is isolated from the ac-
tual return to analyze the effect of the announcement on the studied stock’s performance 
(Agrawal, et Al., 1992). The underlying assumptions behind an event study are the following: 
(Srinicasan and Bharadwaj, 2004) 
A. Financial markets are efficient; securities are fairly priced 
B. Shareholders are the only relevant group of stakeholders for a firm  
C. Researchers can isolate the share price reaction to the event of interest  
D. An appropriate benchmark model is used to compute the abnormal returns 
3.6.1 The event study analysis 
The effect of an event on the shareholder value is captured by the stock’s abnormal returns 
(MacKinlay, 1997). Thus, the purpose of an event study is to separate firm specific events 
from the market events and analyze whether the event of interest generates significant abnor-
mal returns (Benninga, 2008). The abnormal return is the difference between the stock’s actu-
al return and the expected return. It is necessary to aggregate the abnormal returns both 
through cross and time sections to assess the event of interest (MacKinlay, 1997).  As an 
event study relies on the assumption that the markets are efficient, it is presumed that the 
stock prices quickly adjust to the announcement. The execution of an event study is as fol-
lows: (Srinicasan and Bharadwaj, 2004) 
1. Event identification 
2. Defining of criteria for inclusion of the event 
3. Calculation of normal and abnormal returns 
4. Estimation of the normal performance model  
5. Performance of statistical and hypotheses tests. 
! 27!
 
Figure 3.1 The time line of an event study 
 
 
3.6.2 Event identification and definition of criteria for inclusions of the event 
This research analyzes M&A announcements with an event study and how these affect the 
firm value. We concentrate on the assessing whether a strong brand has an effect on the 
shareholder value. The selection criteria and presentation of the treatment and control group 
were defined and stated in the chapter 3.2. 
 
3.6.3 Calculation of normal and abnormal returns 
 
3.6.3.1 Choice of event window 
The event day is the central date of an event study and is denoted as 0 in the figure 3.1. When 
the event of interest is an M&A, it is common to assess the stock price movements upon the 
announcement compared to the market (Benninga, 2008). This is also accurate for this re-
search paper. The purpose is to analyze the abnormal returns around the announcement during 
the chosen event window and capture the effect of the event on the shareholder value 
(MacKinlay, 1997).  
 
The event study relies on the assumption of the effective market hypothesis and the stock 
prices should, thus, incorporate the value creation rapidly (Fama, 1970). The event windows 
often extend to a period of a couple of days prior and after the event (MacKinlay, 1997). It is 
necessary to study the stock price movements before the event as the market might have an-
ticipated the announcement of the event (Bradley, et Al., 1988).  The usual length of the event 
window is three, five, or ten days (Benninga, 2008). However, long-term event studies might 
extend from 20 days prior the event to the closing of the merger (Andrare et Al., 2001).  
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Brandley et Al., (2001) and Brown and Warner (1980) used an event window of 11 days in 
their researches whereas Asquith et Al., (1983) cumulated the returns 20 days before and after 
the event. When conducting an event study, the event windows are fairly narrow (Andrade et 
Al,. 2001). Andrade et Al., (2001) argue that the short event windows give more reliable re-
sults. In fact, Agrawal et Al., (1992) claim that a long-run analysis does not explain better the 
long-term performance after an M&A. In this paper, we have chosen to assess cumulative dai-
ly abnormal returns during an 3-day event window. Andrare et Al., (2001) also used this 
event window in their research. Besides, seven, 11 and 21-days cumulative abnormal returns 
are regressed against independent variables to increase the robustness of the study  
 
3.6.3.2 Estimation window 
The estimation window defines a stock’s normal return compared to the market return (Ben-
ninga, 2008). It is important that the estimation window does not overlap with the event win-
dow. If so, the announcement effect would be incorporated in the calculation of the normal 
return (MacKinlay, 1997).  Schwert (1996) argues that the market anticipates the announce-
ment roughly 42 days before the announcement and this is why Gerbaud and York (2007) es-
timated the normal performance 45 days prior to the event. This procedure is also used in this 
research to secure that the M&A announcements do not affect the normal return.  
 
The commonly used estimation window is 252 trading days, which is approximately one cal-
endar year (Benninga, 2008). The estimation window should be at least 126 trading days, as a 
shorter period would not represent the true relationship between the stock and market return 
and would thus not give robust estimation coefficients (Benninga, 2008). MacKinley (1997) 
proposes that an estimation window of 120 days is appropriate. Consequently, the estimation 
window used in this research extends to 126 trading days, counted backwards from 45 days 
before the event day, until 45 days prior to the event. This is illustrated in the figure 3.1. 
 
3.6.3.3 The market model 
The normal return can be compounded with both statistical and economical models. The sta-
tistical models are, among others, constant-mean-return model, market model or multifactor 
model and the economic models are capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and the arbitrage 
pricing theory (APT) (MacKinlay, 1997). The most common statistical model, which is also 
used in this research paper, is the market model (1).  
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     Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit      (1) 
     E(εit = 0) and var(εit) = σ2εi 
Where: 
Rit = return of security i at time t  
Rmt= market return at time t  
αi = intercept of the regression, the historical performance of security i 
βi= stock’s the systematic firm specific risk, a security i’s sensitivity to market risk 
εit= the error term 
 
The α and β coefficients are firm and transaction specific and compounded by the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) over the estimation window (Benninga, 2008). As all of the firms in 
both the treatment and control groups are large and operate internationally, the market return 
should be a value-weighed, well-diversified market index (Koller et Al., 2010). We selected 
the Morgan Stanley Capital International world index (MSCI) as Koller et Al. (2010) propose.  
 
The expected return (2) for a security is denoted as: 
 
     E[Ri] = αit + βit Rmt      (2) 
 
The expected returns are compounded for each day during the event window. 
 
 
3.6.3.4 Abnormal returns 
 
The abnormal returns are  
     ARit = Rit - αit - βi Rmt      (3) 
or 
         ARit = Rit - E[Ri]     (4) 
Where: 
Rit = the actual return of security i at time t  
Rmt=the actual market return at time t  
αi = intercept of the regression, the historical performance of security i 
βi= stock’s the systematic firm specific risk, a security i’s sensitivity to market risk 
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In fact, the abnormal return is equal to the error term of in the market model.  
 
3.6.4 Aggregation of abnormal returns  
 
The returns should be aggregated through cross and time sections, in order to analyze the 
sample (MacKinlay, 1997).  
 
First, aggregation is the cumulative abnormal return (5), which is only through time for every 
transaction (cross sections) separately.  
 
     CARit =  ∑ ARit       (5) 
Secondly, the abnormal returns are aggregated only through transactions for each day during 
the event window. The average abnormal return (6) is compounded as follows: 
 
     ARRt =1/N ∑ ARit       (6) 
 
The last aggregation, cumulative average abnormal return (7) is both through transactions and 
time.  
 
     CAARt1,t2 =  ∑ ARRt       (7) 
 
3.6.5 Significance testing  
As the 182 M&A transactions form a sample of a “population”, it is important to test whether 
the abnormal returns are significant enough to make conclusions about the population (West-
erlund, 2008).  
 
First, it was tested if the abnormal returns are significantly different from zero with a student 
t-test. We also tested with a two-sample t-test if the mean values between the variables were 
statistically different from each other. This test was done both on all CARs and on the inde-
pendent variable of the regression models. This parametric test requires that the variables are 
normally distributed (Westerlund, 2008).   
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Secondly, we performed a Shapiro-Wilks test to exam whether the different values of CAR 
were normally distributed. The test disclosed that the CARs do not follow the normal distribu-
tion. In this case, the statistical significance could be tested with a non-parametric Mann-
Whitney test. This test compares the median values between the two groups instead of the 
mean value (Pallant, 2010).  
 
3.7 The multiple regression analysis 
To analyze the abnormal returns profounder, we have studied the explanatory power and the 
relationship between dependent variables and independent control variables. The main regres-
sion model of interest is the one with CAR 3 as a dependent variable. We have also decided to 
analyze regression models with CAR 7, 11 and 21 as dependent variables in order to obtain a 
more robust result and enforce the result from the main regression model. According to the 
Fama’s effective market hypothesis (1970), the market should react to the announcement 
news quickly and adjusts the security prices within a very short event window.  
 
As described in the chapter 2.6, the size of the firm might have an effect on the abnormal re-
turns. In this case, the intercept would be different for the treatment and control groups 
(Westerlund, 2008). Creating an additional dummy variable controls for the size effect. First, 
we have run a regular OLS on the modeled regression. Then, the same model is performed 
again but this time the interaction dummy is added. Lastly, the two results are compared and 
if the interaction term is statistically significant and the R-squared value is improved, the in-
teraction term should be included into the regression model (Westerlund, 2008). 
 
The interaction term turned out to be significant, meaning that the size effect needs to be tak-
en into consideration. Thus, it is highly necessary to analyze the cumulative abnormal returns 
with a regression analysis and control for the size effect.  
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3.7.1 Characteristics influencing the value creation within M&As 
Based on theories within value creation connected to brands, different variables have been 
examined to study their impact on the value creation upon the announcement of M&As.  
 
3.7.1.1 Strong brand as a variable 
See theory part 2.4.2. 
 
3.7.1.2 Intangible assets as a variable 
Hsu, et Al., (2013) describe intangible assets as certain non-monetary assets absent of materi-
al substance. Keller and Lehmann (2006, p. 740) claim that “brands are one of the most valu-
able intangible assets a firm has”.  
 
The intangible assets are affected by brands to such an extent, that the term of “brand intangi-
bles” has developed. This term describes different characteristics of a brand’s image, which 
do not include tangible, physical or specific traits or advantages (Levy, 1999). 
 
Many researchers have studied how intangible assets affect stock market performance, and 
Madden et Al., (2006) has found through his research that strong brands originating from the 
United States, contributes with superior long-term stock returns and contain a smaller amount 
of risk. Lane and Jacobson (1995) claim that intangible assets, such as brands, generate great-
er profits than profits generated by solely tangible assets.  
 
3.7.1.3 Relative size as a variable 
According to Servaes (1991), earlier research shows that the relative size of the acquiring 
firm, is an important determinant in the takeover gains. Asquit et Al., (1983) agrees, and spec-
ifies that the relative size of the target to the acquiring firm plays a significant role for the ac-
quirer’s profits when the deal is announced. Tuch and O’Sullivan (2007) continue to discuss 
the importance of the relative size, and how larger targets create more value for the acquiring 
company, than smaller targets do. 
3.7.1.4 Size of acquirer as a variable 
To use total assets as a variable is important according to Grimpe and Hussinger (2008) since, 
when tested if this specific variable has an impact on the result, the coefficient proved to be 
positive and significant across all the models that were tested. 
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Luypaert and Huyghebaert (2008) argue that the firm’s size plays a significant role within 
M&As and that large firms are more probable to acquire other firms since they presumably 
have more cash, borrowing capacity and negotiation power.  
Hitt, et Al., (2009) has done research on mergers and acquisitions over the last 25 years, and 
from this produced a list of the most common variables studied within M&As. From this list it 
is evident that the second most commonly used variable is the acquirer’s size and the relative 
size. These variables were used in 52% of all the studies. 
Every year, Forbes, an American business magazine, produces a list of 100 of the largest 
firms in the world. The list of the largest firms in May 2014, contained several of the same 
firms that were ranked to be the strongest brands in the world on the Interbrand list. Apple, 
GE, Samsung etc. are only to name a few. This confirms the idea that strong brands also are 
large in size (Forbes, 2014). 
 
The table 3.4 summarizes and presents the definitions of all variables. 
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Variable in the OLS-regression 
  
The table summarizes the variable in the OLS-regression and presents their definitions 
 
Dependent variable Definition Source 
    CAR CARit =  ∑ ARit Datastream 
    Independent variables 
   
    Strong Brand 1 if the transaction is performed by a firm in the treatment group Interbrand list 
(a dummy variable) 0 if the transaction is performed by a firm in the control group 
 
    Firm Size A natural logarithm of the total assets S&P Capital IQ 
    Intangible assets A natural logarithm of intangible assets divided by total assets S&P Capital IQ 
    Relative size The deal value divided by the firm total equity Zephyr 
   
S&P Capital IQ 
    Interaction Strong brand variable multiplied by the total assets Interbrand list 
   
S&P Capital IQ 
Table 3.4
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3.7.2 Multiple regression  
The multiple regression model with 5 independent variables will take the following form:  
 
CAR = β + β Strong brand + β Firm size + β Intangible assets  
+ β Relative size + β Interaction term + ε 
 
Where: 
 
CAR = Cumulative abnormal return during 3/7/11/21 days respectively 
β = Coefficients that quantify the partial effect of each variable 
εit= Error term 
 
The regression model was tested and all assumptions for classical linear regression model are 
fulfilled (see appendix 3). 
 
3.8 Reliability 
We have strived to be as accurate and detailed as possible during the research process, to give 
this thesis credibility and a high amount of reliability. Bryman and Bell (2005) claims that 
reliability describes how consistent and accurate results are. All the information that has been 
used, has originated from dependable and acknowledged databases such as: Zephyr, Thomson 
Reuters Datastream Advanced and S&P Capital IQ. The main goal has been to provide accu-
rate results, and if this study would be recreated, the same results would have been attained.  
 
Due to this, we have had to determine certain search criteria that have been followed thor-
oughly. The firms in the control group have been matched with the treatment group, based on 
the industry where the firms operate. One “match” therefore share the same SIC code. Stock 
exchange, and country of origin are also variables that we have tried to match, however, not 
been able to do to a full extent due to the lack of equivalent firms matching our treatment 
group. We are aware that since the SIC code is the only variable that has been matched be-
tween the treatment and control group, this might be criticized. However, we feel that the SIC 
code was the most important variable to match, so that the lists of the firms would have the 
same industry structure. The country of origin as well as the stock exchange were secondary 
since the world’s largest firms are global.  
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We have only excluded information when we have been forced to do so, when we have col-
lected our sample of M&As, but have tried to keep a restricted approach to this. The authors 
that have been referred to within this thesis have been published in a mixture of printed books 
and articles, which have all kept a high degree of reliability and accreditations.   
Since we have used an event study, the research has required a great deal of needlework, and 
we have manually treated all our 182 transactions since the event window for each transaction 
has been unique. All transactions have specific estimation and event windows. Therefore we 
have controlled the announcement dates and compounded the market model’s beta and alpha 
coefficients and expected returns individually, for each transaction. Every transaction has 
been verified twice, to exclude potential errors. No errors could be found.  
Since the event study has required a great amount of needlework, the possibility for human 
mistakes cannot be ruled out, however, we have been as exact as one can be, in able to show a 
reliable result.  
3.9 Validity 
The accuracy of the collected data is crucial for the credibility of this study. The validity de-
pends on if a measurement of a concept accurately portrays what the concept designates 
(Bryman and Bell, 2005). Within our data collection process, we have used relevant variables, 
which have been used by authors published in accredited journals before, in similar research 
methods. Solely scientific articles and recognized journals have been used as sources of refer-
ence. This provides the thesis with a high degree of validity.  
 
Prior research has used the same kind of research method as we have, an event study. This 
method is very well suited for our research purpose, since it has been used to quantify compa-
ny’s marketing related actions, such as brands, in the past by acknowledged authors (Sriniva-
san and Bharadwaj, 2004). 
 
The databases that have been used, Zephyr, Datastream and Capital IQ are all well established 
with a high degree reliability, which contributes to a valid result that has been gained.  
 
The primary source of data for our treatment group, has been the yearly reports produced by 
the brand consultancy Interbrand. Interbrand are the number one brand consultancy in the 
world, and have developed their own brand valuation methodology in able to value the 
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strongest brands in the world. We are aware of that this is a lucrative firm that we are basing 
our research sample upon, which could be criticized due to the lack of academic level. How-
ever, we have found a wide range of authors such as Fehle et Al., (2008), Hsu et Al., (2013) 
and Johansson et Al., (2012), to name a few, who have used and referred to Interbrand in their 
academic research articles. This gives academic strength and validity to using Interbrand in 
our research paper.  
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4. Empirical results and analysis 
The empirical result chapter summarizes the data used in this research and presents the ob-
tained result. First, the characteristics of the data will be presented and then the result from 
the empirical tests and regression analysis.  
 
4.1. Presentation of the data 
The sample consists of 182 observations between 2005 and 2014. See the detailed selection 
criteria in chapter 3.4. 
 
4.1.1 Aggregated abnormal returns 
To obtain a better insight into abnormal returns and to draw conclusions, it is important to ag-
gregate the abnormal returns through time and securities (MacKinlay, 1997).  
Aggregated - average abnormal returns 
The table shows the abnormal return for the event study on all M&A transactions. The sample 
consists of 182 observations between 2005 and 2014.  AAR denotes the aggregated average 
abnormal return for the data on a specific date; ten days prior and after the announcement of 
M&A.  
Sample 
day Nb.obs. AAR CAAR Standard deviation Nb. pos. returns Nb. neg.returns 
-10 182 0.053% 0.053% 1.716% 93 89 
-9 182 0.057% 0.110% 1.803% 102 80 
-8 182 0.005% 0.062% 1.618% 96 86 
-7 182 -0.109% -0.105% 1.885% 79 103 
-6 182 0.135% 0.026% 1.781% 92 90 
-5 182 0.099% 0.234% 1.861% 87 95 
-4 182 0.157% 0.256% 2.066% 83 99 
-3 182 -0.210% -0.053% 1.868% 84 98 
-2 182 -0.136% -0.347% 2.079% 86 96 
-1 182 -0.140% -0.277% 1.697% 88 94 
0 182 0.511% 0.371% 4.091% 97 85 
1 182 0.275% 0.786% 3.116% 95 87 
2 182 -0.093% 0.182% 1.837% 86 96 
3 182 0.180% 0.088% 1.525% 86 96 
4 182 -0.145% 0.035% 1.694% 90 92 
5 182 -0.065% -0.210% 1.874% 89 93 
6 182 0.063% -0.002% 1.865% 78 104 
7 182 -0.030% 0.034% 1.665% 90 92 
8 182 -0.041% -0.071% 1.821% 88 94 
9 182 -0.139% -0.181% 1.511% 78 104 
10 182 -0.009% -0.149% 1.745% 85 97 
Table. 4.1 
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It can be read from table 4.1 that, on average, the firms on the sample have experienced posi-
tive returns on the announcement day and on the following day. Thus, the market has reacted 
positively to the M&A announcement news and the effect is immediately incorporated in the 
stock prices. This is in line with Fama’s (1970) theory on the effective market model. Besides, 
the distribution between positive and negative returns seems to be quite even and the abnor-
mal returns do not exceed one percent. As this research concentrates on assessing whether 
there are differences between the treatment and control group, it is also of interest to divide 
the sample into two sub-groups.  
 
Aggregated - average abnormal returns 
The table shows the abnormal returns for the M&A transactions for the treatment group. The 
sample consists of 89 observations between 2005 and 2014.  AAR denotes the aggregated av-
erage abnormal return for the data on a specific date; ten days prior and after the announce-
ment of M&As.  
Treatment group - Interbrand 
day Nb.obs. AAR CAAR Standard deviation Nb. pos. returns Nb. neg.returns 
-10 89 0.065% 0.065% 1.666% 50 39 
-9 89 0.206% 0.271% 1.287% 53 36 
-8 89 0.232% 0.439% 1.921% 53 36 
-7 89 0.009% 0.242% 1.647% 38 51 
-6 89 -0.006% 0.003% 1.532% 38 51 
-5 89 -0.142% -0.148% 1.696% 41 48 
-4 89 0.086% -0.056% 1.436% 44 45 
-3 89 -0.067% 0.019% 1.414% 43 46 
-2 89 -0.339% -0.407% 1.763% 37 52 
-1 89 -0.269% -0.608% 1.357% 41 48 
0 89 -0.021% -0.290% 2.506% 43 46 
1 89 0.153% 0.132% 1.962% 45 44 
2 89 -0.173% -0.020% 1.548% 43 46 
3 89 0.205% 0.031% 1.471% 47 42 
4 89 -0.227% -0.022% 1.566% 44 45 
5 89 -0.218% -0.445% 1.806% 40 49 
6 89 0.094% -0.124% 1.937% 40 49 
7 89 -0.024% 0.070% 1.332% 47 42 
8 89 -0.107% -0.132% 1.627% 48 41 
9 89 -0.221% -0.328% 1.411% 37 52 
10 89 0.017% -0.203% 1.573% 43 46 
Table 4.2 
 
The abnormal returns, on average, were slightly below zero for the treatment group on the 
announcement day. After the announcement day, the abnormal returns were quite unstable, 
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being both negative and positive. However, the abnormal returns do not exceed the one per-
centage unit.  
 
Aggregated - average abnormal returns 
The table shows the abnormal return for the M&A transactions for the control group. The 
sample consists of 93 observations between 2005 and 2014.  AAR denotes the aggregated av-
erage abnormal return for the data on a specific date; ten days prior and after the announce-
ment of M&As.  
Control Group 
day Nb.obs. AAR CAAR Standard deviation Nb. pos. returns Nb. neg.returns 
-10 93 0.040% 0.040% 1.772% 43 50 
-9 93 -0.086% -0.045% 2.184% 49 44 
-8 93 -0.214% -0.299% 1.235% 43 50 
-7 93 -0.223% -0.436% 2.091% 41 52 
-6 93 0.270% 0.047% 1.990% 54 39 
-5 93 0.330% 0.600% 1.988% 46 47 
-4 93 0.225% 0.554% 2.532% 39 54 
-3 93 -0.347% -0.122% 2.216% 41 52 
-2 93 0.058% -0.289% 2.335% 49 44 
-1 93 -0.018% 0.040% 1.968% 47 46 
0 93 1.021% 1.003% 5.137% 54 39 
1 93 0.392% 1.412% 3.923% 50 43 
2 93 -0.016% 0.376% 2.082% 43 50 
3 93 0.157% 0.141% 1.582% 39 54 
4 93 -0.067% 0.090% 1.813% 46 47 
5 93 0.081% 0.014% 1.936% 49 44 
6 93 0.034% 0.116% 1.804% 38 55 
7 93 -0.035% -0.001% 1.939% 43 50 
8 93 0.022% -0.013% 1.996% 40 53 
9 93 -0.062% -0.040% 1.604% 41 52 
10 93 -0.035% -0.097% 1.903% 42 51 
Table 4.2 
 
The average abnormal returns were positive on the announcement day and exceeded one per-
cent. It might be so that the market has reacted more strongly to the announcement of M&As 
for the control group. It will be tested statistically whether the average mean values differ sig-
nificantly.  
 
To conclude, the results on the tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the opposite of our hypothesis that the 
abnormal returns are greater for firms with strong brand. The market has reacted positively to 
the announcement of M&A for firms in the control group, whereas firms in the treatment 
group are punished with a slightly negative result.  
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The average cumulative abnormal returns are also plotted out on the figure below. It is clear 
that the market has responded to the announcement news on the event day.  
 
 
 
Figure. 1 
 
As the market reacted strongly on the announcement on the event day and on the day after, it 
seems like the market did not anticipate the announcement long before the event day. If this 
would have been the case, we could have seen an increase with a longer duration in average 
cumulative abnormal returns. The stock prices started to incline heavily on the day -1, and 
began to decline after the day 1. This confirms that the three-day event window is appropriate.   
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4.1.2 Descriptive statistics for regression model 
 
The table 4.3 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables 
used in the multiple regressions.  
 
Descriptive statistics  
The table presents the characteristics for the data used in the multiple regression 
  Observations Minimun  Maximum Median  Mean  St. dev. Jarque-Bera 
CAR 3 Days 170 -210554.00 0.2508 0.0011 0.0065 0.0555 266.79 *** 
CAR 7 Days 170 -0.2444 0.3621 0.0011 0.0027 0.0644 384.8148*** 
CAR 11 Days 170 -0.2730 0.3247 -0.0008 0.0032 0.0774 103.13*** 
CAR 21 Days 170 -0.2893 0.3286 -0.0030 0.0017 0.0910 44.64 *** 
Strong brand 170 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5059 0.5014 28.33 *** 
Total Assets 170 4.1897 13.9287 9.3866 9.2837 1.8322 0.69 
Intangible assets 170 -9.7985 -0.7957 -2.9755 -3.1254 1.3540 119.60 *** 
Relative size 170 -6.6065 7.7598 -1.3181 -0.5235 2.3337 31.99 *** 
 Table 4.3 
                                      Descriptive statistics 
The table presents the characteristics for the data divided into two sub-groups, treatment and control 
groups. 
  Treatment Group   Control Group 
  Obs. Median  Mean  JB.   Obs. Median  Mean  JB. 
CAR 3 Days 89 -0.0012 -0.0014 0.6725 
 
93 0.0024 0.0139 62.29 *** 
CAR 7 Days 89 -0.0062 -0.0051 18.84 *** 93 0.0061 0.0125 114.28 *** 
CAR 11 Days 89 -0.0052 -0.0101 29.61*** 93 0.0071 0.0071 22.08 *** 
CAR 21 Days 89 -0.0038 -0.0075 3.0825 
 
93 0.0032 0.0151 12.09 *** 
Strong brand 89 1.0000 1.0000 1.6725 
 
93 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Total Assets 89 10.4288 10.4094 1.2885 
 
93 8.1778 8.15 0.4269 
Intangible as-
sets 88 -3.3018 -3.4529 6.47 ** 
 
89 -2.7278 -2.6454 318.36 *** 
Relative size 87 -1.8997 -1.3520 67.55 
 
88 -0.5127 0.2043 8.3421 ** 
Table 4.4 
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As many of the firms in the treatment group are also the largest firms in the entire world, it 
was not possible to match these firms with as large firms in the control group (Forbes, 2014). 
The descriptive statistics for the two separate groups reveal that there are quite large differ-
ences in mean values for all variables. We will test if these differences are statistically signifi-
cant as they can have a great effect on the interpretation of the result.  
 
4.2 Empirical tests 
First, the results from the event study (e.g. AAR & CARs) are analyzed to test our hypothesis. 
Then, the cumulative abnormal returns are regressed against independent control variables.  
 
 
4.2.1 Test of statistical significance 
First, the average abnormal returns for every day on the event window were tested with the 
student’s t-test. 
H0: AARs = O 
H1 AARs ≠ 0 
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Average abnormal returns 
The entire sample includes 182 observations and treatment and control groups include 89 and 93 re-
spectively.  
  Sample Treatment group Control group 
day AAR T-test AAR T-test AAR T-test 
-10 0.00053 0.1182 0.00065 0.1182 0.00040 0.71779 
-9 0.00057 0.3611 0.00206 0.3611 -0.00086 0.99954 
-8 0.00005 0.2678 0.00232 0.2678 -0.00214 0.01106** 
-7 -0.00109 0.5209 0.00009 0.5209 -0.00223 0.98489 
-6 0.00135 0.6844 -0.00006 0.6844 0.00270 0.37305 
-5 0.00099 0.9867 -0.00142 0.9867 0.00330 0.06058* 
-4 0.00157 0.7262 0.00086 0.7262 0.00225 0.80768 
-3 -0.00210 0.9430 -0.00067 0.9430 -0.00347 0.71101 
-2 -0.00136 0.3208 -0.00339 0.3208 0.00058 0.30649 
-1 -0.00140 0.1905 -0.00269 0.1905 -0.00018 0.46818 
0 0.00511 0.2380 -0.00021 0.2380 0.01021 0.14210 
1 0.00275 0.6354 0.00153 0.6354 0.00392 0.65268 
2 -0.00093 0.4621 -0.00173 0.4621 -0.00016 0.61798 
3 0.00180 0.4881 0.00205 0.4881 0.00157 0.79611 
4 -0.00145 0.1752 -0.00227 0.1752 -0.00067 0.11716 
5 -0.00065 0.6363 -0.00218 0.6363 0.00081 0.81174 
6 0.00063 0.8368 0.00094 0.8368 0.00034 0.28309 
7 -0.00030 0.9868 -0.00024 0.9868 -0.00035 0.23830 
8 -0.00041 0.6325 -0.00107 0.6325 0.00022 0.86554 
9 -0.00139 0.1359 -0.00221 0.1359 -0.00062 0.04501** 
10 -0.00009 0.8926 0.00017 0.8926 -0.00035 0.35540 
Table 4.5 
 
The probabilities from the t-test indicate that the average returns for each day are not signifi-
cantly different from zero for the sample. That is, the null hypothesis is accepted. Control 
group has earned significant average return on days -8, -5 and 9. Though. It is uncertain 
whether these average abnormal returns are engendered due to the M&A announcements as 
these have occurred well before and after the event and not precisely around the event day. 
Other events, e.g. noise, might have produced these average abnormal returns (Brooks, 2008). 
Nevertheless, the abnormal returns must be aggregated both through time and securities in 
order to analyze the event study and make conclusions (MacKinlay, 1997).  
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The statistical significance was tested on the cumulative abnormal returns. According to the 
null hypothesis the cumulative abnormal returns do not differ significantly from zero. If this 
hypothesis is rejected, the firms have experienced significant cumulative abnormal returns 
during the event window.  
 
H0: CARs = O 
H1 CARs ≠ 0 
 
CAR Mean values 
This table shows the mean values for all dependent variable in the regres-
sion analysis with associated p-values. Mean values are presented from 
the entire sample and separately for treatment and control groups.   
Statistic significance: * 10 % level, ** 5 % level and *** 1% level 
  CAR 3 days CAR 7 days CAR 11 days CAR 21 days 
  Sample 
Mean 0.0065 0.0039 0.0043 0.0041 
  
    T-test 0.1129 0.4120 0.4446 0.5418 
  
      Treatment group 
Mean -0.0014 -0.0051 -0.0101 -0.0075 
  
    T-test 0.7126 0.2720 0.0648 0.3110 
  
      Control Group
Mean 0.01392 0.0125 0.01814 0.01507 
  
    T-test 0.0503* 0.1225 0.06087 * 0.16783 
Table 4.6 
 
According to the two-tailed t-test, the null hypothesis is accepted for all mean values meaning 
for the treatment group. The null hypothesis is rejected for CAR 3 and CAR 11 for the control 
group, meaning that the cumulative abnormal returns are significantly different from zero. 
This test was performed with MS excel.  
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We also performed a two-sample t-test for means in order to check whether the mean values 
differ statistically between the treatment and control groups. This test was also performed 
with MS excel.  
 
H0: There are no differences in variables’ mean values between the groups 
H1: There are differences in variables’ mean values between the groups 
 
T-test on mean differences  
This table shows the mean values and differences for all variables in the regression analysis with associated 
p-values. Mean values are presented for the entire sample and separately for treatment and control groups. 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances.   
Statistic significance: * 10 % level, ** 5 % level and *** 1% level 
  Control group Treatment group Mean diff. T-stat t Critical two-tail p-value 
CAR 3 Days 0.0139 -0.0014 0.0153 * -1.9269 1.9772 0.056 
CAR 7 Days 0.0125 -0.0051 0.0176 * -1.9027 1.9762 0.059 
CAR 11 Days 0.0181 -0.0101 0.0283 ** -2.5729 1.9765 0.0111 
CAR 21 Days 0.0151 -0.0075 0.02253 * -1.7224 1.9749 0.0869 
Strong brand 0.0000 1.0000 -1.0000 n.a n.a n.a 
Total Assets 8.1513 10.4094  -2.2581 *** 10.6672 1.9733 7.08E-21 
Intangible assets -2.7278 -3.4529 0.7251 *** -3.7065 1.9737 0.0003 
Relative size 0.2043 -1.3520 -1.5563 *** -4.7042 1.9746 5.41E-06 
Table. 4.7 
 
The null hypothesis is rejected for CAR 11 at 5% -level, and at 10% -level for CAR 3, CAR 7 
and CAR21. That is, the differences in cumulative abnormal returns between the two groups 
are statistically significant. 
 
The mean difference is highly significant for all independent variables at 1% -level. This 
means that it is necessary to control for the size effect as it can have an effect on the cumula-
tive abnormal returns.   
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However, the regular t-test requires that the cumulative abnormal returns are normally dis-
tributed. It is possible to test whether the mean values are normally distributed with a Shapiro-
Wilks test. This test was performed with SPSS 20.0.0 program.  
 
H0 = ut ∼ N( 0,σ2 ) 
H1 ≠ ut ∼ N( 0,σ2 ) 
 
Test of normality  
This table presents the results from the Shapiro-Wilks test for normality 
  Statistic Significance 
CAR 3 0.876 0.0000 
CAR 7 0.888 0.0000 
CAR 11 0.927 0.0000 
CAR 21 0.951 0.0000 
Table 4.8 
 
The p-values reject strongly the null hypothesis meaning that the mean values for cumulative 
abnormal returns are not normally distributed. Thus, the result from the t-test might be biased 
and should be analyzed this in mind.  
 
As the values for the cumulative abnormal returns are not normally distributed, the statistical 
significance can be assessed with Mann-Whitney U test that does not require a normal distri-
bution.  
 
Mann Whitney U      
The table shows the result from the Mann Whitney U test. This 
non-parametric test assesses the median values for CARs between 
the treatment and control group. 
 Statistic Signifinace: * 10 % level, ** 5 % level 
Dependent variable Mann Whitney U Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
CAR 3 3707 0.225 
CAR 7 3517 0.08* 
CAR 11 3204 0.009*** 
CAR 21 3637 0.158 
Table 4.9 
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It appears on the table 4.9 that there is a statistically significant difference in cumulative ab-
normal return for CAR 11 between treatment and control groups at 1% -level. Additionally, 
the difference is significant for CAR 7 at 10 % -level.  
  
Mann-Whitney test       
Ranks 
CAR 11 days N Median mean rank sum of ranks 
Treatment 89 -0.0052 81 7209 
Control 93 0.0071 101.55 9444 
CAR 7 days N   mean rank sum of ranks 
Treatment 89 -0.0062 84.52 7522 
Control 93 0.0061 98.18 9131 
Table 4.10 
 
For both CARs, the cumulative abnormal return is higher for the control group since the mean 
rank is higher compared to that of the treatment group’s.  
 
The null hypothesis cannot be rejected for CAR 3 and CAR 21, which mean that there are no 
statistical differences in abnormal returns between these groups.  
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4.2.2 Regression of CAR  
 
OLS regression          
The table shows the result of OLS in which the CAR 3 is the dependent variable. The model 1 in-
cludes only the independent and control variables. The model 2 includes the interaction term that con-
trols for the size effect.  
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
Statistic significance: * 10 % level, ** 5 % level and *** 1% level 
Model  1 2 
  Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
          
c 0.057578 0.0244** 0.093443 0.0138** 
  
    Strong brand 0.003853 0.7265 0.006366 0.4986 
  
    Total Assets -0.002984 0.3251 -0.006622 0.1168 
  
    Intangible Assets 0.007363 0.0226** 0.009714 0.0028*** 
  
    Relative Size 0.0044 0.0221** 0.004429 0.0418** 
  
    Total assets* Strong brand 
  
8.72E-08 0.0026*** 
          
R-squared 0.097821     0.128542 
          
F-statistic 4.472616     4.838057 
          
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001859     0.000374 
Table 4.11 
 
The model has clearly a better fit when the interaction term is added. On the first model, only 
intangible assets and relative size are significant at 5% -level and the R-squared is fairly poor, 
only approximately 10 percent.  After adding the interaction term, the relative size is still sig-
nificant at 5% level but intangible assets become more strongly significant at 1% level. The 
total assets become almost significant 10 % level. The dummy variable for the strong brand is 
not significant in neither of cases, though, its p-value declines heavily by 20 percentages on 
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the second model. The interaction term is highly significant at 1% level, which basically 
means that total assets have a stronger relationship to cumulative abnormal returns for firms 
with strong brands than for those with inferior brands. The R-squared increases by 3 percent 
and the model’s explanation power improves. Consequently, the interaction term should be 
included on the regression.  
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OLS -regression                 
The table presents the results from the OLS regressions with different CARs as dependent variables. The data is balanced and 170 observations 
are included into the regression models.  
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance  
Statistic significance: * 10 % level, ** 5 % level and *** 1% level 
Dependent variable CAR 3 CAR 7 CAR 11 CAR21 
  Coefficient  P-value Coefficient  P-value Coefficient  P-value Coefficient  P-value 
  
        c 0.093443 0.0138** 0.082404 0.0629* 0.095601 0.0475** 0.098132 0.0684* 
  
        Strong brand 0.006366 0.4986 0.00278 0.8103 -0.006731 0.6257 0.002555 0.8765 
  
        Total Assets -0.006622 0.1168 -0.005805 0.2765 -0.00713 0.1996 -0.009542 0.1124 
  
        Intangible Assets 0.009714 0.0028*** 0.009509 0.0082*** 0.008299 0.0591* 0.004285 0.406 
  
        Relative Size 0.004429 0.0418** 0.004701 0.0218** 0.006878 0.0222** 0.007139 0.0387** 
  
        Total assets* Strong brand 8.72E-08 0.0026*** 1.08E-07 0.0008*** 1.46E-07 0.0006*** 1.73E-07 0.0001*** 
                  
R-squared 0.128542   0.098934   0.122644   0.088251   
F-statistic 4.838057   3.601334   4.585032   3.174829   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000374   0.004068   0.00061   0.009196   
Table 4.12
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It can be seen that all regression models have a R-squared around 0,10. CAR 3 has the best fit 
as almost 13 % of variation in cumulative abnormal returns can be explained by the inde-
pendent variables. The null hypothesis that the beta coefficients are jointly zero is rejected at 
1% -level for all regression models.  
 
Moreover, the coefficients on intangible assets and the interaction term are positive and sig-
nificant at 1% level. The relative size has also a positive and statistically significant relation-
ship to cumulative abnormal returns at 5%-level. The coefficient on the total assets is nega-
tive, but only significant at 12% - level. The dummy variable “strong brand” has a positive 
coefficient but it is not statistically significant.  
 
Since the residuals were not perfectly normally distributed, though close (see appendix 3), we 
also wanted to run the regression model without taking the extreme value into consideration. 
Removing the outliers can improve the distribution of the residuals and thus, the result from 
the regressions become more reliable (Brooks, 2008). This can be done by creating dummy 
variables that take the value 1 for an outlier. It is necessary to create a distinct dummy varia-
ble for each outlier (Brooks, 2008).  A more specified list on the outliers and the deal numbers 
is presented on the appendix 4. 
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OLS regression - removed outliers                
This table presents the result from the OLS regressions after removing the outliers’ effect on the result.  
CAR3 and CAR7: Outliers that were removed experience an abnormal return of +/- 10 % 
CAR11 and CAR21: Outliers that were removed experience an abnormal return of +/- 15 % 
 See appendix 4 for a detail list of the outliers 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
Statistic significance: * 10 % level. ** 5 % level and *** 1% level 
Dependent variable CAR 3 CAR 7 CAR 11 CAR 21 
  Coefficient  P-value Coefficient  P-value Coefficient  P-value Coefficient  P-value 
          
    c 0.077678 0.0007 0.065565 0.0044 0.055785 0.0449 0.005833 0.8505 
  
        Strong brand 0.008907 0.288 0.003527 0.7066 -0.006563 0.5999 -0.018121 0.2114 
  
        Total Assets -0.005492 0.0303 ** -0.004518 0.1066 -0.003959 0.253 -0.000499 0.9004 
  
        Intangible Assets 0.0096 0.0001 *** 0.009092 0.0002 *** 0.004778 0.0805 * -0.000717 0.8605 
  
        Relative Size 0.003136 0.0145** 0.004871 0.0001*** 0.007436 0.0001 *** 0.006459 0.0111 ** 
  
        Total assets* Strong brand 7.93E-08 0.0006 *** 1.04E-07 0.0001*** 1.14E-07 0.0019 *** 1.21E-07 0.0014 *** 
  
        R-squared 0.600611   0.667157   0.583298 
 
0.565369   
          
   
  
F-statistic 19.67506   20.57875   15.49773 
 
10.91228   
          
   
  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   0.000000   0.000000 
 
0.000000   
Table 4.13
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At first glance, it is obvious that the R-squared values improve considerably. CAR 21 –model 
has the lowest fit at 0.57 and CAR 7 the best at 0.67.  Not only the R-squared values improve 
extensively but also the F-statistics; CAR 3 and 7 have F statistics close to 20. The associated 
p-values for F-statistics are 0.0000 for all models. Consequently, the null hypothesis that the 
beta coefficients are jointly zero is again rejected at the 1% -level for all regression models. 
 
When taking a closer look at the CAR 3 model, it is apparent that all of the control variables 
are significant at least at the 5% -level. Intangible assets, interaction term and relative size are 
all positive and significant at the 1% -level and 5% -level. This supports our hypothesis that 
strong brands contribute to value creation through shareholder value as many companies book 
brands in “intangible assets” –post (Keller and Lehmann, 2006). However, the dummy varia-
ble “strong brand” is not significant, nonetheless the coefficient is positive. Still, the associat-
ed p-value improves from 0,49 to 0,29 after removing outliers’ effect on the result. The coef-
ficient on the interaction term is positive and highly significant at 1% -level. This indicates 
that total assets have a stronger positive relationship to cumulative abnormal returns for firms 
with strong brands than for those with inferior brands. The coefficient on the firm size is neg-
ative and significant at 5%-level.  
 
 
 
 
4.3 Summary of the empirical results 
 
H1: Strong brands have an effect on the cumulative abnormal returns upon an an-
nouncement of an M&A 
 
The tables 4.2 and 4.3 on the aggregated cumulative abnormal returns showed that the 
control group had gained higher abnormal returns than the treatment group. This was 
then challenged and the student t-test showed that the control group had experienced 
statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns on the days -8, -5 and 9. It could 
not be proved that the treatment group had gained abnormal returns that were differ-
ent from zero. We also tested the mean differences between the groups and found that 
these differences were significantly different from each other. However, as the cumu-
lative abnormal returns were not completely normally distributed, we performed a 
Mann-Whitney U test to control whether there were statistically significant differ-
ences between the two groups. The Mann-Whitney test indicated that the abnormal 
returns were higher for the control group for the CAR 7 and CAR 11. No significant 
result was found for CAR 3. This result is in line with the findings of Asquith et Al., 
(1983). They claim that large acquirers are likely to gain only insignificant abnormal 
returns if the relative size is low. This can explain the difference in cumulative ab-
normal returns between the two groups, as the firms in the treatment group are signif-
icantly larger and their acquisitions’ relative sizes are significantly smaller.  
 
It is necessary to regress the CARs against control variables, since the result shows 
that there are significant differences in mean values for firm characteristics. After 
eliminating the outliers’ effect on the result, it emerged that all control variables were 
significant at least at the 5% -level. The dummy variable for strong brand was positive 
but not statistically significant. The interaction term (strong brand *total assets) is 
positive and highly significant at the 1% level, which suggests that the total assets 
have a stronger relationship to cumulative abnormal returns for firms with strong 
brands than for those with inferior brands. This indicates that strong brands can have a 
positive effect on the cumulative abnormal returns. As the coefficient on the total as-
sets was negative and significant and the coefficient on the relative size is positive 
and significant, the result must be assessed with carefulness.  
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The total assets were significantly larger and the relative size significantly lower for 
the treatment group. An increase in relative size results in an increase in cumulative 
abnormal returns, whereas an increase in total assets yields in a decline in cumulative 
abnormal returns. The latter effect is stronger for the firms with strong brands. This 
result indicates that a strong brand could be advantageous for smaller firms conduct-
ing M&A activities and larger firms with strong brands are associated with less prof-
itable M&As.  
 
H2: The value creation effect of a strong brand depends on the size effect 
 
The empirical result verified that there are statistically significant differences in the 
mean values for all variables between the treatment and control groups. The total as-
sets were significantly larger for the treatment group and the relative size was lower. 
We expected this to affect the cumulative abnormal returns for the treatment group 
negatively, which the result enforced.  
 
The result from the regression analysis shows that the control variable “total assets” 
was negative and significant and that the variable “relative size” positive and signifi-
cant. Hence, these variables have the predicted effect on the cumulative abnormal re-
turns and we can conclude that the value creation effect depends on the size effect.  
 
Moreover, we created a dummy variable that allowed different intercepts for the two 
groups and, thus, controlled for the size effect between the two groups. The interac-
tion term is positive and statistically significant at 1% -level, showing that the firm 
size has different effect on the firms in the two groups. As the coefficient on the total 
assets is negative, and the coefficient on the strong brand variable positive, the result 
suggest that the strong brands might have a positive relationship with the cumulative 
abnormal return, but this effect weakens as the size of a firm rises.  
 
To conclude, the null hypothesis for H2 is rejected and hypothesis that the value crea-
tion effect of a strong brand depends on the size effect is accepted.  
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5. Analysis and discussion 
In our analysis and discussion we start by analyzing the results connected to our hy-
potheses. We finish off with a presentation of “The Branded Illusion Hypothesis”, to 
give the reader an overall review of what our analysis has contributed with. 
 
5.1 Strong brands have an effect on the shareholder value upon the announce-
ment of an M&A 
 
The coefficient on the “strong brand” dummy variable is positive, but not significant 
at the 5% level. On its own, it does not support our hypothesis but together with the 
size effect it does. We suggest that strong brands actually have an effect on the cumu-
lative abnormal returns. However, this is not the case for the treatment group since the 
relative size has a positive relationship with cumulative abnormal returns and an in-
crease in total assets yields in a decline in cumulative abnormal returns. The total as-
sets were significantly larger, and the relative size lower for the treatment group. The 
interaction term indicates that the firm size’s negative effect on the cumulative ab-
normal returns is stronger for the firms in the treatment group, which explains why 
the treatment group did not gain an as high cumulative abnormal return as the control 
group did.  
 
To sum up, this indicates that strong brands have an effect on the shareholder value 
upon the announcement of an M&A, but the significant size-effect must be considered 
when assessing the result.  
 
5.2 Why large firms fail to exploit brand assets? 
The negative and significant coefficient for the total assets suggests that the large 
firms with strong brands are associated with less profitable M&As. This signals that 
larger firms actually fail to exploit their brands in an M&A context. Nevertheless, 
Luypaert and Huyghebaert (2008) claim that large firms are more likely to acquire 
other firms since they presumably have more financial slack and borrowing capacity.  
 
One possible explanation could be that managers engage in M&A activities if they 
believe that they could improve target’s business processes and bring about opera-
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tional synergies. As Bradley et Al., (1983) found, the acquirers experience higher re-
turns from M&As, if they succeed in reallocating the assets in a more profitable way. 
Large firms with strong brands could perhaps aim to extend their brand on the targets 
products or provide more extensive marketing and distributions channels in order to 
engender higher cash flows.  
 
However, large firms are often diversified and operate in several branches, which can 
make it harder for them to realize these gains. It might be so that large firms often 
need to grow outside their main business area if they already are market leaders. The 
larger the company gets the harder it becomes to find a firm that would be suitable for 
the acquirer’s portfolio of businesses. It becomes harder to combine and manage the 
new asset portfolio, especially if the acquirer and the target are not operating in the 
same industry. In this case, managers might not have the needed knowledge about the 
industry and its requirements and thus, do not contribute with anything new. In worst-
case scenario, it can be even harmful for the merged firm. Managers of well-known 
brands might be under the impression that the brand assets will give them advantages 
and additional power. Still, we find it hard to believe that large firms would be the 
best owner for several firms that operate in uncorrelated industries at the same time. 
Large well-known diversified firms might lack the flexibility to quickly adjust to the 
market demands and to respond to customers’ constantly changing demands. The 
negative coefficient on the firm size support this hypothesis, as large firms with 
strong brands do not succeed as well as smaller firms with strong brands do.  
 
Furthermore, the hubris hypothesis could provide an explanation to the abovemen-
tioned problem. Overconfident managers might engage in acquiring other firms be-
cause they overestimate the target’s value and their own managerial capabilities (Roll, 
1986). Thus, they are persuaded that the target’s market value does not reflect its true 
economic value and that they are capable of making the required enhancements in the 
target’s operations. It could be so that managers of larger firms often are experienced 
and have a long and successful career, which could contribute to the confirmation bias 
that they have when bidding for the target. This could be very likely if large firms al-
ready are diversified and the managers do not have enough knowledge about the 
branch. Due to the information asymmetry problem, it is likely that the overconfident 
managers are optimistic, rely on the brand’s market power and overestimate the tar-
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get’s market value. Consequently, the managers, who overpay for the target, need to 
take the dilution cost of the acquisition. The dilution cost is equal to the additional 
value that overconfident managers believe they provide for the shareholders (Shefrin, 
2005). Large firms with well-known brands must have had a successful historical per-
formance; as otherwise, their market position and recognized brand would not have 
been established. This success is often a result of skills and pure luck. Overconfident 
managers might overestimate their contribution and suffer from the illusion of control 
(Shefrin, 2005). They might overemphasize their managerial skills and believe that 
they will be able to steer the M&A process.  
 
Additionally, the hubris hypothesis presumes that the acquirer must over pay for the 
target as otherwise the target’s management would not approve to sell. They need to 
pay high premiums and suffer from the winner’s curse. The target’s management 
might equally be overconfident and overestimate the target’s future prospects. This 
could also increase the premiums paid and thus, the target’s management’s negotia-
tion power constitutes a critical aspect in this context. In other words, the target could 
exploit its brand. Among others, Facebook’s WhatsApp acquisition and Google’s 
Motorola acquisition are included in the sample. If a market leader acquirers a strong 
competitor, it is barely possible that the premium paid is low.  
 
We also considered that Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis could provide a 
partial explanation for why large firms fail to exploit their brand assets. When manag-
ers have a lot excess cash available, they tend to spend it on unnecessary and unprof-
itable investments. Bruner (1988) argues that the acquirers have a lot more financial 
slack than firms generally have. Bate et Al., (2009) found that S&P 500 firms hold 
50% more cash in their balance sheet in 2006 than in 1998 and firms in the treatment 
group also belong to S&P 500 firms. Large firms with strong brands might engage in 
M&A activities not only for strategic reasons but also for disposing the financial 
slack. On the other hand, excessive amounts of financial slack can result in less disci-
plined managers. Such managers might be eager to extend their own empire on the 
shareholders’ cost. Of course, out of self-interest, it is better for the manager’s career 
to hold control of a large firm containing multiple well-known brands. It looks good 
on the résumé, opens up other career possibilities and might even give additional 
acknowledgement within the manager’s social circuits. If they acquire other compa-
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nies in order to improve their own personal position and power, they are not acting on 
the behalf of the shareholders.  
 
5.3 The Branded Delusion hypothesis 
The analysis above indicates that managers might rely on the market power of the 
brands when they engage in M&A activities. They might be delusional and believe 
that “the bigger the brand is, the greater the outcome will be”. Consequently, they 
succumb under the branded delusion.  
 
Despite this belief, our result shows that the smaller firms exploit brand assets in a 
more efficient manner in the M&A context than large firms do. 
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Conclusion 
In the conclusion, we connect our research purpose, results and analysis in able to 
make an overall conclusion of our study. Continuing, we will introduce our academic 
contribution. Lastly, we will recommend areas for further research.  
  
6.1 Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to study if strong brands have an effect on the share-
holder value upon the announcement of an M&A. In addition to this, we have studied 
if the value creation effect within M&As depend on the company’s size. 
 
Or results show, that brands might have an effect on the value creation in M&As, but 
it must be analyzed with the size-effect. The total assets variable had not only a 
smaller effect on the cumulative abnormal return, but also a negative one for the 
treatment group. The interaction term indicates that the total assets’ negative effect on 
the cumulative abnormal returns is stronger for the firms in the treatment group This 
indicates that the variable has a different effect on the firms with strong brands, than 
on those with weaker brands. This means that larger firms with strong brands are as-
sociated with less successful M&As, than smaller firms with strong brands. A reason 
for this could be due to over confident managers, which is in line with the hubris hy-
pothesis. Another reason could be that the large firms are too diversified and cannot 
benefit from the synergy gains.  
 
These conclusions have led us to formulate a new hypothesis called “The Branded 
Delusion”. This hypothesis claims that managers might be so blinded by their capabil-
ities and the brand’s greatness that they get delusional when engaging in M&A activi-
ties. 
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Academic contribution 
We contribute to academic research by providing a new aspect of analyzing value 
creation within M&As. Our results indicate that brands have an effect on the value 
creation within M&As, and that managers should take this into consideration when 
acquiring other firms. In addition, we contribute with “The Branded Delusion”, a hy-
pothesis saying that managers could get delusional by their capabilities and the 
brand’s greatness when engaging in M&A activities.  
 
6.2 Further research 
Our academic contribution has led to some further questions that should be studied: 
 
1. Since large firms holding multiple brands often are diversified, it would be out 
of interest to control if the target firm operates in the same industry as the ac-
quirer. This would be added to the regression model to remove the effect of 
diversification. 
2. The dummy variable has its weaknesses, as it does not measure the real value 
of brands. It would therefore be beneficial if future researchers would find a 
proxy to measure the financial value of brands and asses it in the regression 
model.  
3. It would be of interest to test whether our hypothesis “The Branded Delusion” 
could be applied on one specific industry, to show whether there are differ-
ences between industries.  
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Appendix 1. Interbrand group transactions 
 
 
Acquiring firm Target firm Event day CAR 3 days CAR 7 days CAR 11 days CAR 21 days Deal value 
3M COMPANY CUNO INC. 
12/05/05 0.0759% 0.9993% 0.6018% -1.2580% 1298.4 
3M COMPANY AEARO TECHNOLOGIES INC. 
15/11/07 0.9265% 3.4856% -0.2971% -2.5124% 1200 
ACCENTURE PLC ACQUITY GROUP LTD 
17/05/13 1.6316% 2.0735% 2.8772% 3.1078% 
316.00 
ADIDAS-SALOMON AG REEBOK INTERNATIONAL LTD 
03/08/2005 7.3426% 3.8993% 3.9867% 0.3964% 3800 
ADOBE SYSTEMS INC. MACROMEDIA INC. 
18/04/2005 -6.5321% -7.3509% -8.0355% -12.2353% 3400 
ADOBE SYSTEMS INC. NEOLANE SA 
27/06/13 0.9752% 0.5364% 1.8953% 7.0338% 
600.00 
AMAZON.COM INC. ZAPPOS.COM INC. 
22/07/09 3.6586% -6.3481% -3.7484% -0.3234% 
930.10 
AMAZON.COM INC. KIVA SYSTEMS INC. 
19/03/12 4.4949% 5.4443% 8.9668% 11.1401% 
775.00 
AMAZON.COM INC. QUIDSI INC. 
08/11/10 0.8747% 1.2417% -6.3761% -2.4069% 
545.00 
AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY GE CONSUMER FINANCE INC'S COM-
MERCIAL CARD AND CORPORATE 
PURCHASING BUSINESS UNIT 27/03/08 -8.0118% -2.2259% 4.4678% 3.5793% 
1100.00 
AVON PRODUCTS INC. SILPADA DESIGNS INC.'S ASSETS 
09/07/10 0.3324% 2.3112% 2.1231% 6.3550% 
727.00 
AVON PRODUCTS INC. PREPARACIONES DE BELLEZA 
07/10/05 -0.1408% 1.5890% 4.7164% 4.9021% 154 
AXA SA WINTERTHUR SWISS INSURANCE COM-
PANY 14/06/2006 -2.2420% -0.6182% -3.0189% -2.1175% 11010.68 
AXA SA AXA ASIA PACIFIC HOLDINGS LTD'S 
ASIAN BUSINESSES 30/03/2010 -0.2875% 2.7049% 2.6457% 5.8290% 9760.87 
AXA SA FINAXA SA 
29/06/2005 -0.0013% -1.7421% 1.8920% 2.6817% 7 146.38 
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Acquiring firm Target firm Event day CAR 3 days CAR 7 days CAR 11 days CAR 21 days Deal value 
BURBERRY GROUP PLC BURBERRY ASIA LTD 
16/07/2010 4.0664% 6.7146% 5.0836% -0.7928% 109.26 
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY WILLIAM BOLTHOUSE FARMS INC. 
09/07/2012 -1.0444% -0.6540% -0.5081% 2.2840% 1550.00 
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY ECCE PANIS INC. 
02/04/2009 -6.9900% -5.6373% -8.2964% -13.0247% 66.00 
CATERPILLAR INC. BUCYRUS INTERNATIONAL INC. 
15/11/2010 1.3274% 3.0786% 2.4269% 4.6732% 8800.00 
CATERPILLAR INC. PROGRESS RAIL SERVICES CORPORAT-
ION 16/05/2006 -3.7357% -13.4563% -11.8795% -10.2651% 1000.00 
CISCO SYSTEMS INC. SCIENTIFIC ATLANTA LLC 
18/11/2005 -3.1615% -1.8614% -0.1027% -1.4539% 6900.00 
CISCO SYSTEMS INC. NDS GROUP LTD 
31/07/2012 2.1355% 2.4494% 3.1357% 4.0796% 5000.00 
CISCO SYSTEMS INC. WEBEX COMMUNICATIONS INC. 
15/03/2007 1.0409% -1.4323% -3.2699% -8.8774% 3200.00 
CISCO SYSTEMS INC. STARENT NETWORKS CORPORATION 
13/10/2009 -0.8169% -1.6316% -1.7890% -0.7704% 2900.00 
CISCO SYSTEMS INC. SOURCEFIRE INC. 
23/07/2013 -1.5585% -2.5269% -2.8747% -0.8687% 2700.00 
COCA-COLA COMPANY, THE ENERGY BRANDS INC. 
25/05/2007 1.8067% 2.0879% -0.4708% -1.3512% 4100.00 
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE COM-
PANY 
UNILEVER NV'S SANEX BUSINESS 
23/03/2011 2.2053% 4.2727% 4.1421% 6.1226% 960.08 
DISCOVERY COMMUNICATIONS 
INC. 
PROSIEBENSAT.1 MEDIA AG'S NORDIC 
TV OPERATIONS 14/12/2012 0.8234% 1.3640% -0.0812% 1.8994% 1700.00 
EBAY INC. SKYPE TECHNOLOGIES SA 
12/09/2005 -1.7664% -6.3858% -8.7034% -4.4034% 3900.00 
EBAY INC. GSI COMMERCE INC. 
28/03/2011 -2.5991% 0.2498% -2.1337% -4.7028% 2400.00 
EBAY INC. GMARKET INC. 
15/04/2009 -2.3239% -4.5183% 6.6981% 20.4214% 1200.00 
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Acquiring firm Target firm Event day CAR 3 days CAR 7 days CAR 11 days CAR 21 days Deal value 
FACEBOOK INC. WHATSAPP INC. 
19/02/2014 1.8529% 0.0391% -0.8648% -2.7766% 19000.00 
FEDEX CORPORATION WATKINS MOTOR LINES INC. 
26/05/2006 -1.7803% -1.3078% 1.1135% -0.0087% 780.00 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY VISTEON CORPORATION'S UNPROFIT-
ABLE AUTO PARTS MANUFACTURING 
PLANTS, OFFICES, RESEARCH CENTERS 
AND OTHER FACILITIES 13/09/2005 2.9618% -0.6737% 0.1586% 0.9489% 1150.00 
GAP INC. ATHLETA INC. 
22/09/2008 -3.7374% -8.1074% -1.3132% -0.2935% 150.00 
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC. LEG NRW GMBH 
11/06/2008 5.4652% 9.3385% 13.5258% 16.1457% 5287.71 
GOOGLE INC. MOTOROLA MOBILITY HOLDINGS INC. 
15/08/2011 -5.5956% -10.3661% -8.9228% -0.6768% 12500.00 
GROUPE DANONE SA KONINKLIJKE NUMICO NV 
20/08/2007 6.3890% 2.6699% -2.3298% -4.9170% 10 437.69 
HERTZ GLOBAL HOLDINGS INC. DOLLAR THRIFTY AUTOMOTIVE 
GROUP INC. 26/08/2012 10.7376% 16.1376% 10.9702% 17.2206% 2600.00 
HERTZ GLOBAL HOLDINGS INC. DONLEN CORPORATION 
17/07/2011 1.8570% -1.2734% -6.3213% -13.7887% 947.00 
HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS CORPO-
RATION 13/05/2008 -8.2831% -4.8591% -5.1965% -4.3104% 13900.00 
HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY MERCURY INTERACTIVE CORPORAT-
ION 25/07/2006 2.1495% -3.5717% -2.3814% 2.4712% 4500.00 
HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY 3COM CORPORATION 
11/11/2009 -0.5145% -0.0916% 0.1720% 0.8696% 2700.00 
HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY OPSWARE INC. 
23/07/2007 -0.6303% 1.4649% 0.3889% 7.0545% 1600.00 
HTC CORPORATION S3 GRAPHICS COMPANY LTD 
06/07/2011 -4.6145% 0.8345% -21.4677% -16.6324% 300.00 
INTEL CORPORATION MCAFEE INC. 
19/08/2010 -0.7214% -1.8083% -3.5893% -10.6677% 7680.00 
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INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
MACHINES CORPORATION 
COGNOS INC. 
12/11/2007 -0.2422% -6.8796% -8.9817% -9.2386% 5000.00 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
MACHINES CORPORATION 
SOFTLAYER TECHNOLOGIES INC. 
04/06/2013 -1.2303% 0.4348% 0.7695% 0.8086% 2000.00 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
MACHINES CORPORATION 
FILENET CORPORATION 
10/08/2006 0.5962% 1.8373% 3.7081% 4.1928% 1600.00 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
MACHINES CORPORATION 
STERLING COMMERCE INC. 
24/05/2010 1.5989% -0.9161% -1.6626% 5.8555% 1400.00 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
MACHINES CORPORATION 
KENEXA CORPORATION 
27/08/2012 -0.4155% -1.5431% -2.8614% -1.2468% 1300.00 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
MACHINES CORPORATION 
SPSS INC. 
28/07/2009 -0.4862% -2.1647% -4.5608% 0.4805% 1200.00 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
MACHINES CORPORATION 
ASCENTIAL SOFTWARE CORPORATION 
14/03/2005 -0.6447% -0.6229% -0.5455% 0.9827% 1100.00 
KELLOGG COMPANY PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY'S 
PRINGLES MANUFACTURING DIVISION 15/02/2012 5.1303% 4.4469% 3.4041% 4.4569% 2695.00 
KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS 
ELECTRONICS NV 
AVENT HOLDINGS LTD 
23/05/2006 3.0177% 2.5845% 2.1348% -3.8668% 876.19 
L'ORÉAL SA YSL BEAUTÉ SAS 
30/04/2008 0.0660% 0.9253% 1.5883% -11.0036% 1812.85 
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL 
INC. 
CTF HOTEL HOLDINGS INC.' 32 HOTELS 
28/04/2005 -5.4460% -6.3512% -2.6877% -14.2973% 1450.00 
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL 
INC. 
RYMAN HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES 
INC.'S GAYLORD HOTELS BRAND AND 
MANAGEMENT COMPANY 31/05/2012 -2.3858% -2.9505% -3.3677% -4.4307% 210.00 
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL 
INC. 
PROTEA HOTEL GROUP (PTY) LTD 
22/01/2014 0.2605% 0.1322% 1.7589% 2.7102% 186.43 
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL 
INC. 
HOTEL AC DIPLOMATIC SL 
16/03/2011 0.1672% 1.2142% -1.2615% -4.0721% 58.68 
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL 
INC. 
HOTEL DRUZHBA 
18/03/2009 0.5988% -4.8027% -0.7385% 2.8528% 1.88 
 
 
Acquiring firm Target firm Event day CAR 3 days CAR 7 days CAR 11 days CAR 21 days Deal value 
MASTERCARD INC. TRAVELEX HOLDINGS LTD'S CARD 
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS 
09/12/2010 2.7593% 0.7834% -12.7615% -10.9951% 474.25 
MICROSOFT CORPORATION SKYPE GLOBAL SARL 
10/05/2011 -1.7674% -1.9853% -0.1519% -2.3663% 8500.00 
MICROSOFT CORPORATION AQUANTIVE INC. 
18/05/2007 -0.2488% -1.8222% -0.4080% -1.7241% 6000.00 
MICROSOFT CORPORATION NOKIA OYJ'S DEVICES AND SERVICES 
OPERATIONS 03/09/2013 -8.4810% -7.9891% -8.1032% -0.3778% 4999.12 
NESTLÉ SA PFIZER INC.'S INFANT NUTRITION 
BUSINESS 23/04/2012 -2.2401% -1.6744% 0.0025% 0.0420% 11850.00 
NESTLÉ SA GERBER PRODUCTS COMPANY 
12/04/2007 -1.0288% -2.2727% -0.5206% -1.2012% 5500.00 
NESTLÉ SA KRAFT FOODS INC.'S US AND CANADA 
FROZEN PIZZA BUSINESS 04/01/2010 -2.0175% -6.1292% -4.5520% -3.7096% 3700.00 
NOVARTIS AG HEXAL AG 
21/02/2005 5.1581% 3.1171% 3.7872% -0.3294% 6863.46 
NOVARTIS AG CHIRON CORPORATION 
03/04/2006 -0.2204% 1.0897% 0.8413% -1.2886% 5315.63 
ORACLE CORPORATION PEOPLESOFT INC. 
13/12/2004 -0.4990% -0.7665% -0.9185% -2.2546% 10300.00 
ORACLE CORPORATION BEA SYSTEMS INC. 
16/01/2008 3.2514% 9.9506% 7.4466% -0.8078% 7200.00 
ORACLE CORPORATION SIEBEL SYSTEMS INC. 
12/09/2005 2.1301% -0.8954% -1.5357% -5.9296% 5850.00 
ORACLE CORPORATION SUN MICROSYSTEMS INC. 
20/04/2009 3.1687% 2.1913% -1.0599% -14.4264% 5600.00 
ORACLE CORPORATION HYPERION SOLUTIONS CORPORATION 
01/03/2007 3.8259% 3.0784% -1.3189% 1.4233% 3300.00 
 
 
Acquiring firm Target firm Event day CAR 3 days CAR 7 days CAR 11 days CAR 21 days Deal value 
PFIZER INC. WYETH LLC 
26/01/2009 0.2853% 3.1221% 0.6331% 2.2644% 68000.00 
POLO RALPH LAUREN CORPO-
RATION 
SUN APPAREL INC. 
23/01/2006 1.1479% 0.3763% 0.5281% 1.2241% 355.00 
SAP AG BUSINESS OBJECTS SA 
07/10/2007 -4.4889% -8.2096% -8.1280% -11.9616% 6164.69 
SAP AG HYBRIS AG 
05/06/2013 1.4448% 2.0808% 2.1042% 0.3576% 1500.00 
STARBUCKS CORPORATION TEAVANA HOLDINGS INC. 
14/11/2012 -4.8625% -2.3363% -3.1348% 11.9537% 620.00 
THOMSON REUTERS CORPO-
RATION 
THOMSON REUTERS PLC 
22/06/2009 -4.6340% -4.6859% -8.9009% -12.4578% 5497.08 
VISA INC. CYBERSOURCE CORPORATION 
21/04/2010 1.6558% 1.1741% 0.7266% -6.9437% 2000.00 
VOLKSWAGEN AG PORSCHE AG 
04/07/2012 6.5639% 5.1567% 4.9116% 5.6316% 5521.76 
WALT DISNEY COMPANY, THE PIXAR ANIMATION STUDIOS INC. 
24/01/2006 -1.3031% -1.1861% -0.5573% 10.3700% 7400.00 
WALT DISNEY COMPANY, THE LUCASFILM LTD 
30/10/2012 -2.4464% -3.0226% -3.6226% -6.1339% 4060.00 
WALT DISNEY COMPANY, THE MARVEL ENTERTAINMENT INC. 
31/08/2009 -2.6590% -2.1551% -3.7874% 2.1894% 3924.39 
XEROX CORPORATION AFFILIATED COMPUTER SERVICES INC. 
28/09/2009 -5.5693% 0.7775% 0.4462% -0.2963% 8700.00 
XEROX CORPORATION GLOBAL IMAGING SYSTEMS INC. 
02/04/2007 -0.1237% -1.2038% -1.9252% -0.0457% 1500.00 
YAHOO! INC. TUMBLR INC. 
20/05/2013 0.4115% -4.0155% -4.8383% -0.5676% 1100.00 
 
 
Appendix 2. Control group transactions
Acquiring firm Target firm Event day CAR 3 days CAR 7 days 
CAR 11 
days 
CAR 21 
days 
Deal val-
ue 
ACTAVIS LTD WARNER CHILCOTT PLC 
20/05/2013 4.7120% 5.2699% 5.7392% 15.0615% 8529.52 
ACTAVIS PLC FOREST LABORATORIES INC. 
18/02/2014 8.7245% 11.7555% 12.7756% 11.8953% 24244.51 
ACTIVISION BLIZZARD INC. AMBER HOLDING SUBSIDIARY COMPANY 
25/07/2013 14.7707% 16.4988% 15.8072% 10.6186% 5830.00 
ACTIVISION INC. VIVENDI GAMES INC. 
02/12/2007 21.0172% 16.3400% 29.5209% 30.6628% 8120.75 
ASML HOLDING NV CYMER INC. 
17/10/2012 -4.5712% -2.2265% -0.5716% 0.5022% 2557.20 
AVIS BUDGET GROUP INC. ZIPCAR INC. 
02/01/2013 4.1200% 6.0621% 2.0497% -0.3131% 500.00 
BONDUELLE SA FRANCE CHAMPIGNON HOLDING SA 
03/02/2010 -2.8046% -6.2936% -9.1394% -5.9615% 141.53 
BROADCOM CORPORATION NETLOGIC MICROSYSTEMS INC. 
12/09/2011 4.0199% 4.5027% 7.0048% 10.1465% 3700.00 
CBS CORPORATION CNET NETWORKS INC. 
15/05/2008 -6.3379% -6.1569% -5.4086% -2.3574% 1750.57 
CENTURYLINK INC. QWEST COMMUNICATIONS INTERNA-
TIONAL INC. 22/04/2010 -6.0562% -6.0788% -4.8399% -2.9239% 22400.00 
CENTURYLINK INC. SAVVIS INC. 
27/04/2011 1.2601% 1.5077% 0.3944% 3.0996% 3200.00 
CLOETTA AB LEAF HOLLAND BV 
16/12/2011 5.8570% 14.8334% 15.4325% 9.6104% 1010.72 
CLOETTA AB ALRIFAI NUTISAL AB 
09/12/2013 0.5599% -0.4309% -1.1361% -3.8010% 62.92 
CONAGRA FOODS INC. RALCORP HOLDINGS INC. 
27/11/2012 3.9280% 5.1310% 4.5927% 4.0301% 6800 
 
 
Acquiring firm Target firm Event day CAR 3 days CAR 7 days CAR 11 days CAR 21 days Deal value 
CONTINENTAL AG SIEMENS VDO AUTOMOTIVE AG 
(NEW) 25/07/2007 1.0198% 3.2957% 5.7047% -3.7493% 16827.56 
CONTINENTAL AG VEYANCE TECHNOLOGIES INC. 
10/02/2014 0.2314% 1.2899% 0.3194% -2.9327% 1906.95 
CONTINENTAL AG MOTOROLA INC'S AUTOMOTIVE 
ELECTRONICS BUSINESS 
03/04/2006 5.6260% 3.5748% 4.8460% 6.5145% 1000.00 
COTT CORPORATION CLIFFSTAR CORPORATION 
07/07/2010 0.6227% 0.6133% 4.8720% -5.7839% 569 
COWEN GROUP INC. BEL RÉ SA 
31/12/2010 1.1699% 0.4058% 3.9446% -2.2346% 292.96 
DARDEN RESTAURANTS INC. RARE HOSPITALITY INTERNATION-
AL INC. 16/08/2007 -1.9669% -2.2249% -0.4007% -2.8216% 1400.00 
DARDEN RESTAURANTS INC. YARD HOUSE USA INC. 
12/07/2012 -1.5498% 0.3078% 0.6785% -0.3871% 585.00 
DECKERS OUTDOOR CORPORATION SANUK BRAND 
19/05/2011 -1.1351% -3.0048% -4.6188% -8.7191% 120.00 
DISH NETWORK CORPORATION DBSD NORTH AMERICA INC. 
01/02/2011 1.9276% 2.9252% -0.6529% 10.2798% 1400.00 
DISH NETWORK CORPORATION TERRESTAR NETWORKS INC.'S AS-
SETS 12/03/2012 -0.8956% 3.1698% 4.4757% 11.0227% 1375.00 
ENIRO AB FINDEXA LTD 
26/09/2005 -4.0250% -4.2535% -0.0767% 0.3200% 970.46 
ENIRO AB RESPONS AB 
27/03/2003 -1.0328% -1.6717% -3.1118% 3.1079% 125.69 
GROUP 1 AUTOMOTIVE INC. UAB MOTORS PARTICIPAÇÕES SA 
24/01/2013 2.7239% 1.7408% 1.9854% 0.3000% 208.07 
HARRIS CORPORATION STRATEX NETWORKS INC. 
05/09/2006 2.1188% -0.5341% -3.2153% -4.2733% 479.50 
HARRIS CORPORATION LEITCH TECHNOLOGY CORPORA-
TION 31/08/2005 -0.6745% -3.6809% 5.8153% 1.6710% 451.71 
HARRIS CORPORATION MULTIMAX INC. 
31/05/2007 -2.8726% 0.2745% 2.6216% 5.5498% 400.00 
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Acquiring firm Target firm Event day CAR 3 days CAR 7 days CAR 11 days CAR 21 days Deal value 
HARRIS CORPORATION CAREFX CORPORATION 
22/02/2011 -2.7717% -3.0076% -5.7323% -2.9707% 155.00 
HARRIS CORPORATION TYCO ELECTRONICS WIRELESS 
SYSTEMS 16/04/2009 -6.8002% -8.9426% -6.9081% -9.2342% 675.00 
HARRIS CORPORATION CAPROCK COMMUNICATIONS COR-
PORATION 
21/05/2010 -3.5284% -3.8443% -1.8256% -4.2775% 525.00 
HEXAGON AB INTERGRAPH CORPORATION 
06/07/2010 4.9722% 3.5157% 14.2246% 13.0736% 2125.00 
HYATT HOTELS CORPORATION PEABODY ORLANDO, THE 
28/08/2013 -0.0483% -1.8545% 1.0410% 1.0931% 717.00 
IHS INC. RL POLK & COMPANY 
10/06/2013 5.4261% 4.7985% 5.4046% -2.1736% 1400.00 
IHS INC. SMT HOLDING CORPORATION 
26/07/2011 -4.4985% -7.0719% -9.1266% -2.2482% 500.00 
IHS INC. JANE'S INFORMATION GROUP 
(HOLDINGS) LTD 12/06/2007 5.6998% 6.2402% 8.5769% 16.5667% 183.50 
IHS INC. GLOBAL INSIGHT INC. 
18/09/2008 -21.0554% -22.5004% -24.3918% -21.0752% 164.67 
IHS INC. GLOBALSPEC INC. 
12/06/2012 0.1448% 0.9305% -0.5612% 0.1616% 135.00 
IHS INC. ATRION INTERNATIONAL INC. 
22/09/2010 0.2789% 1.7466% 2.5270% -0.1232% 80.00 
KAO CORPORATION MOLTON BROWN LTD 
15/07/2005 2.4313% -1.5669% -2.9997% -3.3528% 298.51 
LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP PLC NATIONWIDE UNIT TRUST MANAG-
ERS LTD 07/02/2007 -0.0026% 1.1832% -0.3059% -4.7936% 584.25 
LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL INC. BDGB ENTERPRISE SOFTWARE 
(LUX) SÀRL 05/03/2012 -0.9364% -2.6069% -4.3150% -13.2862% 148.00 
LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL INC. SAPERION AG 
20/08/2013 -0.7837% -7.6685% -13.3899% -12.8742% 72.00 
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Acquiring firm Target firm Event day CAR 3 days CAR 7 days CAR 11 days CAR 21 days Deal value 
LIQUIDITY SERVICES INC. JACOBS TRADING COMPANY'S 
CONSUMER GOODS REMARKETING 
BUSINESS 01/09/2011 25.0766% 36.2086% 32.4732% 31.8342% 170.00 
LIQUIDITY SERVICES INC. GENEVA INDUSTRIES LTD 
10/04/2008 3.2159% 1.2588% 6.8025% -2.0359% 20.10 
LIQUIDITY SERVICES INC. BURNS ENTERPRISES LTD 
01/11/2012 -1.9111% -3.1418% 0.4186% -5.8503% 18.00 
LIQUIDITY SERVICES INC. NETWORK INTERNATIONAL INC. 
09/06/2010 -0.5613% 0.1873% -0.6606% -0.7922% 15.00 
MCBRIDE PLC DASTY ITALIA SPA 
12/02/2007 -0.5636% -1.4449% -1.4396% 7.0785% 38.31 
MCBRIDE PLC SANMEX INTERNATIONAL LTD 
03/04/2006 -0.5215% 0.4143% 0.3290% -0.7648% 12.87 
MONITISE PLC CLAIRMAIL INC. 
26/03/2012 2.3474% 4.7211% 3.5345% -2.1273% 170.45 
MONITISE PLC GRAPPLE MOBILE LTD 
04/09/2013 9.1620% 10.6562% 21.7942% 23.0043% 56.14 
MSC INDUSTRIAL DIRECT COMPA-
NY INC. 
BARNES DISTRIBUTION 
22/02/2013 -0.6590% -0.2123% 0.7138% 3.8950% 550.00 
MSC INDUSTRIAL DIRECT COMPA-
NY INC. 
KENNAMETAL INC.'S J&L INDUS-
TRIAL SUPPLY BUSINESS 17/10/2011 2.0805% 1.4492% 0.6923% 3.2553% 349.50 
NORDSTROM INC. HAUTELOOK INC. 
17/02/2011 0.3477% -0.9150% 1.4811% 8.5838% 270.00 
PERRY ELLIS INTERNATIONAL INC. TROPICAL SPORTSWEAR INTERNA-
TIONAL CORPORATION 16/12/2004 4.3142% 9.7511% 9.1743% 9.6163% 8 500.00 
PERRY ELLIS INTERNATIONAL INC. RAFAELLA APPAREL GROUP INC.'S 
ASSETS 07/01/2011 14.9070% 1.9394% 2.0850% 2.4865% 80.00 
PERRY ELLIS INTERNATIONAL INC. PARLUX FRAGRANCES INC.'S PER-
RY ELLIS BRAND 06/12/2006 1.4796% 4.5390% 1.2995% 3.4383% 63.00 
PERRY ELLIS INTERNATIONAL INC. LIZ CLAIRBORNE INC'S C&C CALI-
FORNIA BRAND 08/01/2008 21.5663% 5.4312% 9.6815% 32.8585% 37.00 
POST HOLDINGS INC. DAKOTA GROWERS PASTA COM-
PANY INC. 16/09/2013 5.1302% -1.3952% -1.8577% -11.9887% 370.00 
PRICELINE.COM INC. KAYAK SOFTWARE CORPORATION 
08/11/2012 0.5029% 3.0434% 13.1026% 15.6878% 1650.00 
 
 
Acquiring firm Target firm Event day CAR 3 days CAR 7 days CAR 11 days CAR 21 days Deal value 
PVH  PHILLIPS-VAN HEUSEN COR-
PORATION 
TOMMY HILFIGER BV 
15/03/2010 11.4592% 15.0716% 20.4781% 21.0446% 2948.21 
PVH  PHILLIPS-VAN HEUSEN COR-
PORATION 
SUPERBA INC. 
11/10/2006 3.3421% 6.1438% 7.5123% 2.0836% 180.00 
PVH CORPORATION WARNACO GROUP INC., THE 
31/10/2012 22.6758% 19.7472% 20.1715% 19.3436% 2900.00 
RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL INC. MORGAN KEEGAN & COMPANY 
INC. 11/01/2012 -2.1847% -2.7148% 0.0483% -0.0132% 930.00 
REVLON INC. MIRAGE COSMETICS INC.'S CER-
TAIN ASSETS 08/11/2012 -2.0497% -0.2925% 0.2303% 2.6322% 60.00 
SALESFORCE.COM INC. EXACTTARGET INC. 
04/06/2013 -8.9042% -3.8026% -11.5127% -17.3901% 2500.00 
SALESFORCE.COM INC. BUDDY MEDIA INC. 
04/06/2012 -1.5461% -6.5833% -12.3647% -11.8365% 688.00 
SALESFORCE.COM INC. JIGSAW DATA CORPORATION 
21/04/2010 6.5604% 6.1508% 9.3313% 12.5062% 156.20 
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES COMPANY AIRTRAN HOLDINGS INC. 
27/09/2010 9.5646% 7.0970% 7.2652% 5.9967% 3420.00 
ST JUDE MEDICAL INC. AGA MEDICAL HOLDINGS INC. 
18/10/2010 1.2965% -2.1891% -4.7065% -6.5930% 1300.00 
ST JUDE MEDICAL INC. ADVANCED NEUROMODULATION 
SYSTEMS INC. 16/10/2005 7.6783% 7.0147% 4.7408% 0.7315% 1 300.00 
ST JUDE MEDICAL INC. ENDOSENSE SA 
19/08/2013 0.0056% -1.6431% -3.2990% -4.2640% 333.13 
ST JUDE MEDICAL INC. ENDOCARDIAL SOLUTIONS INC. 
23/09/2004 4.4067% 4.3813% 5.2820% 4.4178% 272.00 
SYMANTEC CORPORATION VERITAS SOFTWARE CORPORA-
TION 16/12/2004 -7.4074% -24.4444% -27.3002% -28.9262% 13500.00 
SYMANTEC CORPORATION ALTIRIS INC. 
29/01/2007 -2.4412% 1.1643% -0.9767% -16.6915% 830.00 
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Acquiring firm Target firm Event day CAR 3 days CAR 7 days CAR 11 days CAR 21 days Deal value 
SYMANTEC CORPORATION MESSAGELABS LTD 
08/10/2008 -6.3131% -4.0731% -15.0490% -6.2130% 695.00 
SYMANTEC CORPORATION CLEARWELL SYSTEMS INC. 
19/05/2011 -2.0493% -4.2375% 1.2149% -1.6487% 390.00 
SYMANTEC CORPORATION VONTU INC. 
05/11/2007 -5.4733% -5.2730% -3.9407% -10.7483% 350.00 
SYMANTEC CORPORATION PGP CORPORATION 
29/04/2010 -0.9097% -3.2298% 3.9056% 1.3097% 300.00 
TAKEDA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., 
LTD 
NYCOMED INTERNATIONAL MAN-
AGEMENT GMBH 19/05/2011 0.1496% 0.6419% -1.2748% 0.0176% 12851.52 
TOSHIBA CORPORATION SONY SEMICONDUCTOR KYUSHU 
CORPORATION'S 300MM WAFER 
LINE FABRICATION FACILITIES AT 
THE NAGASAKI TECHNOLOGY 
CENTRE 20/02/2008 -2.2839% 4.3836% 9.6465% 3.8830% 979.86 
TOTAL SYSTEM SERVICES INC. NETSPEND HOLDINGS INC. 
01/07/2013 0.8731% 2.7948% 6.9112% 7.6195% 1400.00 
UNITED ONLINE INC. FTD GROUP INC. 
17/07/2008 3.7188% 4.9093% 9.9163% 9.6986% 754.00 
UNITED ONLINE INC. CLASSMATES ONLINE INC. 
25/10/2004 -8.4195% -9.3988% -10.3609% 3.5343% 100 
UNITED ONLINE INC. MYPOINTS.COM INC. 
11/04/2006 0.2412% 3.6549% 3.5732% 0.9099% 56.00 
VMWARE INC. AIRWATCH LLC 
22/01/2014 -0.3346% -3.3383% -2.9091% -2.0039% 1545.00 
VMWARE INC. NICIRA NETWORKS INC. 
23/07/2012 -0.7262% 14.8148% 6.3882% 8.0352% 1260.00 
VMWARE INC. SPRINGSOURCE GLOBAL INC. 
10/08/2009 -3.7219% -4.1930% -7.2578% -17.0110% 420.00 
WESTERN UNION COMPANY, THE CUSTOM HOUSE LTD 
31/08/2009 -7.0238% -2.7276% -4.4905% 1.6421% 370.00 
WESTERN UNION COMPANY, THE ANGELO COSTA SRL 
31/12/2010 1.0874% 1.5120% 4.5293% 1.1947% 130.38 
WPP PLC AKQA HOLDINGS INC. 
20/06/2012 3.2340% -0.0770% -4.2483% -3.9072% 600.00 
 
 
Appendix. 3 Classical linear regression model assumptions 
The multiple regression model must respect the six underlying assumptions of the 
classical linear regression (Westerlund, 2008).  If the assumptions are not fulfilled the 
coefficients will biased and OLS cannot be applied.   
 
1. The model must be linear in the parameters 
The assumption was tested with the Ramsey Reset test. The null hypothesis is 
not rejected and thus, it can be concluded that the model is correctly specified.  
 
 
   Table 1: Ramsey Reset test 
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2. The mean value for the errors must be zero  
   E(ut) =0 
As a constant term is included in the equation, the assumption is not violated.  
 
3. The variance of the error must be constant 
   Var (ut) = σ2 < ∞ 
The assumption was tested with White’s and Breuch-Pagan-Godfrey tests. 
Both test reject the null hypothesis about homoscedasticity. In order to respect 
this assumption, the regressions are run with heteroscedasticity-robust stand-
ard errors and the standard errors are adjusted.  
 
Heterosckedasticity Test: White  
F-statistic 1.957652 Prob. F(18.151) 0.0153 
Obs.*R-squared  32.16542 Prob. Chi-Squared (18) 0.0210 
Scaled explained SS 122.3372 Prob. Chi-Squared (18) 0.0000 
Table 2. White Specification test, Dependent variable: CAR3 
Heterosckedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
F-statistic 4.176256 Prob. F(5,164) 0.0013 
Obs.*R-squared  19.20052 Prob. Chi-Squared (5) 0.0018 
Scaled explained SS 73.02684 Prob. Chi-Squared (5) 0.0000 
Table 3. Breusch-Pagan-Godfey test, Dependent variable: CAR3 
 
4. The errors must be linearly independent of each other 
   Cov (ui, uj) = 0 
The sample neither is nor time series or in chronologic order over time. Here-
with, the assumption is not violated.  
 
5. The independent variable must be non-stochastic 
   Cov (ui, xj) = 0 
Assessing the Pearson Correlation matrix tested the assumption. The matrix 
did not show any track of multicollinearity and the assumption is not violated. 
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Pearson correlation 
The table shows the correlation between the variables.  
Statistic signifinace: * 10 % level, ** 5 % level and *** 1% level 
Variable  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
            
CAR 3 days 1         
            
Strong Brand  -0,143784 * 1       
            
Total Assets   -0,193959 ** 0,649280 *** 1     
            
Intangible assets 0,226557 ***  -0,273061 ***  -0,303302 *** 1   
            
Relative size 0,232268 **  -0,354082 ***  -0,343045 *** 0,142903 * 1 
Table. 4 
 
Pearson correlation 
The table shows the correlation between the variables.  
Statistic signifinace: * 10 % level, ** 5 % level and *** 1% level 
Variable  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
            
CAR 7 days 1         
            
Strong Brand -0,124349 1       
            
Total Assets   -0,138737 * 0,649280 *** 1     
            
Intangible assets 0,174791 **  -0,273061 ***  -0,303302 *** 1   
            
Relative size 0,202517 ***  -0,354082 ***  -0,343045 *** 0,142903 * 1 
Table. 5 
 
Pearson correlation 
The table shows the correlation between the variables.  
Statistic signifinace: * 10 % level, ** 5 % level and *** 1% level 
Variable  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
            
CAR 11 days 1         
            
Strong Brand  -0,180507 ** 1       
            
Total Assets   -0,164328 **   0,649280 *** 1     
            
Intangible assets  0,132491 *  -0.273061**  -0.303302 *** 1   
            
Relative size  0,250248 **  -0.354082 ***  -0.343045 ***   0.142903 * 1 
Table. 6 
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Pearson correlation 
The table shows the correlation between the variables.  
Statistic signifinace: * 10 % level, ** 5 % level and *** 1% level 
Variable  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
            
CAR 21 days 1         
            
Strong Brand -0,106314 1       
            
Total Assets  -0,115716 0,64928 *** 1     
            
Intangible assets 0,037906  -0,273061 ***  -0,303302 *** 1   
            
Relative size   0,201420***  -0,354082 ***  -0,343045 ***   0,142903 * 1 
Table. 7 
 
6. The error terms are normally distributed  
H0 = ut ∼ N(0,σ2) 
This assumption was tested with Jacque Bera –test and by detecting a histo-
gram over the residual, which showed that the residuals do not follow the 
normal distribution. However, as the sample is large and the residuals are very 
close to the normal distribution, it will not bias the result (Westerlund, 2008). 
Thus, the assumption is not violated in a way that would bias the result.  
 
 
 
Table. 8: Residuals normality test, CAR3 
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Table. 9: Residuals normality test, CAR7 
 
 
Table. 10: Residuals normality test, CAR11 
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Table. 11: Residuals normality test, CAR21 
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Appendix 4. List of the outliers in the regression model 
 
 
CAR 3 
A table over the outliers that exceed +/- 10 % on CAR 3 regression 
Observation residual  Outliers  Deal nb. 
92 0.12993 ACTIVISION BLIZZARD INC. 1601473789 
93 0.15058 ACTIVISION INC. 598748 
122 -0.25152 IHS INC. 1601017929 
129 0.22855 LIQUIDITY SERVICES INC. 1601297178 
143 0.16348 PERRY ELLIS INTERNATIONAL INC. 610061 
146 0.20029 PVH CORPORATION 1601416237 
162 -0.13802 UNITED ONLINE INC. 288739 
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CAR 7 
A table over the outliers that exceed +/- 10 % on CAR 7 regression 
Observation Residual  Outliers  Deal nb. 
39 0.14872 HERTZ GLOBAL HOLDINGS INC. 1601397617 
92 0.14874 ACTIVISION BLIZZARD INC. 1601473789 
93 0.10675 ACTIVISION INC. 598748 
122 -0.26198 IHS INC. 1601017929 
129 0.34580 LIQUIDITY SERVICES INC. 1601297178 
144 0.11825 
PVH  PHILLIPS-VAN HEUSEN 
CORPORATION 
1601164956 
146 0.17460 PVH CORPORATION 1601416237 
152 -0.25259 SYMANTEC CORPORATION 303064 
162 -0.14282 UNITED ONLINE INC. 288739 
167 0.15157 VMWARE INC. 1601389313 
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CAR 11 
A table over the outliers that exceed +/- 15 % on CAR 11 regression 
Observation Residual  Outliers  Deal nb. 
45 -0.17669 HTC CORPORATION 1601283560 
93 0.21440 ACTIVISION INC. 598748 
122 -0.29330 IHS INC. 1601017929 
129 0.29622 LIQUIDITY SERVICES INC. 1601297178 
136 0.19319 MONITISE PLC 1909017020 
144 0.16564 
PVH  PHILLIPS-VAN HEUSEN COR-
PORATION 
1601164956 
146 0.17579 PVH CORPORATION 1601416237 
152 -0.29122 SYMANTEC CORPORATION 303064 
162 -0.16891 UNITED ONLINE INC. 288739 
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CAR 21 
A table over the outliers that exceed +/- 15 % on CAR 21 regression 
Observation Residual  Outliers  Deal nb. 
31 0.22190 EBAY INC. 1600001000 
39 0.16897 HERTZ GLOBAL HOLDINGS INC. 1601397617 
93 0.22764 ACTIVISION INC. 598748 
122 -0.25357 IHS INC. 1601017929 
129 0.28328 LIQUIDITY SERVICES INC. 1601297178 
136 0.21117 MONITISE PLC 1909017020 
143 0.27693 PERRY ELLIS INTERNATIONAL INC. 610061 
144 0.18268 
PVH  PHILLIPS-VAN HEUSEN COR-
PORATION 
1601164956 
146 0.18237 PVH CORPORATION 1601416237 
148 -0.17742 SALESFORCE.COM INC. 1601481515 
152 -0.30436 SYMANTEC CORPORATION 303064 
168 -0.16513 VMWARE INC. 1601102954 
174 -0.16119 POST HOLDINGS INC. 1601494965 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Den varumärkta illusionen
Coca Cola, Apple, Microsoft, lis-
tan kan göras lång. Världens 
starkaste varumärken genomför 
årligen åtskilliga förvärv av nya 
företag. Men bidrar starka varu-
märken till värdeskapande vid 
företagsförvärv?  
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Företagsförvärv sker i allt större ut-
sträckning. Forskningen kring förvärvs 
värdeskapande är extensiv. Dock finns 
det viktiga faktorer som har förbisetts i 
nuvarande litteratur. En av dessa fak-
torer heter varumärken.  
 
Forskarna Ristola och Skara har un-
dersökt om starka varumärken har en 
bidragande effekt på värdeskapandet 
vid företagsförvärv. Undersökningen 
har utförts genom en event studie, där 
företagsförvärv utförda utav världens 
starkaste varumärken, har jämförts 
med förvärv gjorde av mindre starka 
varumärken.  
 
Genom att kontrollera för hur den 
onormala avkastningen förändras efter 
utannonseringen av förvärvet, kan de 
från sina resultat utläsa att varumär-
ken har en påverkan på värdeskapan-
det vid förvärv. Dock inte på egen 
hand.  
 
Den intressanta aspekten är att varu-
märken endast har en påverkan på 
värdeskapandet i kombination med 
företagets storlek.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resultaten i studien visade att varu-
märken har en positiv påverkan på 
värdeskapandet för mindre bolag med 
starka varumärken. De stora kassa-
kossorna så som Coca Cola, Apple 
etc. visade sig ha en negativ påverkan 
på värdeskapandet vid förvärv.  
 
- Detta kan ha många olika för-
klaringar, hävdar Ristola. Före-
tagsledare kan lida av stor-
hetsvansinne vid förvärv och 
värdera målföretaget på ett 
orealistiskt sätt. De innehar inte 
heller den kunskap som det 
nya bolaget kräver, om detta 
verkar inom en ny bransch.  
 
För att sammanfatta, starka varumär-
ken har en påverkan på värdeskapan-
det vid företagsförvärv när det uppkö-
pande företagets storlek beaktas.  
Till mångas förvåning har dock de 
stora och starka varumärkena en ne-
gativ påverkan på värdeskapandet vid 
företagsförvärv. Detta kan uttryckas 
som ”den varumärkta illusionen”. 
 
Text: Viktoria Skara 
